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Abstract
Inspired by recent work in ethology and animal training, we integrate representations for time and rate into a
behavior-based architecture for autonomous virtual creatures. The resulting computational model of affect and
action selection allows these creatures to discover and refine their understanding of apparent temporal causality
relationships which may or may not involve self-action. The fundamental action selection choice that a creature must
make in order to satisfy its internal needs is whether to explore, react or exploit. In this architecture, that choice is
informed by an understanding of apparent temporal causality, the representation for which is integrated into the
representation for action. The ability to accommodate changing ideas about causality allows the creature to exist in
and adapt to a dynamic world. Not only is such a model suitable for computational systems, but its derivation from
biological models suggests that it may also be useful for gaining a new perspective on learning in biological systems.
The implementation of a complete character built using this architecture is able to reproduce a variety of conditioning
phenomena, as well as learn using a training technique used with live animals.
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1.0 Introduction
In order to survive in a dynamic environment, many self-regulating systems - both biological and
computational - make use of representations that model important aspects of the world. Two such
representations fundamental for living systems are the passage of time, and the rate at which they
experience relevant stimuli.
Early models of behavioral conditioning, such as the Rescorla-Wagner model, minimized the use of
representation and speak simply of animals forming and strengthening associations between stimuli.
While this associative model is successful at rendering explainable certain phenomena, there is a wide
range of phenomena that it is unable to model without substantial trouble, such as the ability to learn
an expected latency of reinforcement. Recent studies by Gallistel and others have considered the
possibility that models of time and rate are fundamental to conditioning phenomena. Gallistel and
Gibbon propose two new models - Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET) and Rate Estimation Theory (RET) -
that require an animal to represent the length of the interval between stimuli, and the rate of
reinforcement associated with various stimuli. Using these models, the authors are able to account for a
number of conditioning phenomena that can not be explained using the Rescorla-Wagner model
[Gallistel 1990], and they do so in a clear and elegant way.
Similarly, much of the early work in behavior-based artificial intelligence minimized the importance of
representation [Brooks 1991b]. Recent work in the Synthetic Characters group involved incorporating
time into the representations of a behavior-based system. The use of temporal representations was a bit
ad-hoc, in that we used multiple representations spread throughout the system in a way that worked,
but perhaps was not as elegant as one would wish. However, the use of time in the representation
allowed us to model the kind of applied operant conditioning that underlies dog training. The sorts of
learning that could occur within the previous framework included Thorndike's Law of Effect, wherein
the relative frequency of behaviors reflects the relative value of their apparent consequences [Thorndike
1911]; cue learning, in which the system identified contexts in which particular actions are most reliable;
behavioral shaping, in which the system learned the best way in which to perform a given action so as
to improve its chances of desirable consequences; and the relative reliability of actions.
Our goal was to re-implement much of the learning mechanism in a way that pays attention to the sort
of details that Gallistel attends to in the SET and RET models. The resulting representations and
mechanisms needed to operate in real-time with dozens of potential stimuli. We wished to maintain,
and hopefully improve upon, the system's ability to model a dog training paradigm and other sorts of
learning.
We have arrived at the representations and mechanisms described in this thesis. They are not simply a
recreation of Scalar Expectancy Theory and Rate Estimation Theory. Instead, they represent a hybrid
that integrates new components inspired by Gallistel and Gibbon's work into the Synthetic Characters
cognitive architecture. A creature constructed using this new architecture can predict and plan for
future events by discovering causality relationships in the world. The creature is motivated to learn by
a desire to explain salient stimuli it perceives. Its representation of apparent temporal causality is
tightly integrated with its fundamental representation for action selection.
As we had hoped, the resulting architecture is capable of reproducing a wide variety of conditioning
phenomena, as well as providing a robust implementation of the clicker training paradigm. We claim
the following contributions based on the work presented in this thesis:
1.1 From a Cognitive Architectures perspective
* A model for action selection and learning that integrates apparent temporal causality into the
action selection mechanism of a complete virtual creature.
* An implementation of that model's representations and mechanisms.
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* Extensive visualizers that provide an observer with the ability to monitor the learning process.
* Two creatures that serve as robust, working examples.
1.2 From an Animal Behavior perspective
* The integration of computational models from ethology into a computational architecture
designed to support non-trivial creatures in complex worlds.
* Discussion of how the behavior architecture is able to reproduce a variety of conditioning
phenomena that can be observed in live subjects. Because it is derived from biological models,
there is some suggestion that this architecture may allow us to gain a new perspective on
learning in biological systems.
* Discussion of the benefits gained from being inspired by the ethological models, and the
challenges discovered implementing the computational models described by SET and RET.
1.3 Thesis Overview
We begin in Section 2 with an introduction to the sources of inspiration behind this work: the
philosophy of the Synthetic Characters group, the layered brain architecture upon which we built this
system, and the ethology described in Time, Rate and Conditioning.
We then present in Section 3 a description of the new cognitive architecture. We begin with the notion
that creatures have internal needs that they seek to satisfy, and show how this motivates their action
selection decisions. We then demonstrate the benefits creatures obtain by learning about apparent
temporal causality while they are on the job. We conclude with a discussion of how apparent temporal
causality lets us model changes in a creature's affective state.
In Section 4, we present our results from a cognitive architectures point of view. We describe some
lessons learned integrating the new representations and operations into the existing architecture, and
then analyze two characters built using the new architecture. We use two scenarios - an applied
operant conditioning technique, and another more whimsical domain in which a creature discovers
apparent temporal causality in its world - to illustrate the learning process in more depth.
In Section 5, we discuss the results from an ethological point of view. We describe the challenges and
successes we had integrating the SET and RET computational models into a complete cognitive
architecture. We include a recreation of Gallistel and Gibbon's "Different Answers to Basic Questions"
that contrasts the implemented model with the timing and associative models. We conclude by
discussing the architecture's ability to reproduce a variety of conditioning phenomena that have been
observed in real animals during experimental protocols.
In Section 6, we present references to some related work from both the virtual ethology and cognitive
psychology fields.
We conclude in Section 7 with some of the important ideas that we uncovered during this research,
followed by a summary of contributions and avenues for future research.
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2.0 Background: Sources of Inspiration
This thesis begins with a discussion of the philosophy that inspires the Synthetic Characters group's
attempt to understand the nature of intelligent behavior. This will lead us into an overview of the
group's previous cognitive architecture.
Our goal is to augment that architecture to include a representation of apparent temporal causality. If
we do this, a creature that uses the architecture will be able to use its understanding of past events, its
perceptions of the present, as well as its predictions of future events, to inform decisions that help it satisfy
its drives.
The search for appropriate representations leads us to our ethological inspiration. Scalar Expectancy
Theory and Rate Estimation Theory provide a computational model that allows a creature to predict the
timing of future events, and help decide which stimuli are worth attending to.
We will thus conclude the Section with our goal: to integrate elements of these ethological models into
the cognitive architecture to provide the creature with an understanding of apparent temporal
causality.
2.1 But first, some Definitions
Before we begin, we should define several important terms that we will use during this discussion:
representation, model, mechanism and architecture.
A representational system has two essential ingredients:
* The represented world: that which is to be represented, and
e The representing world: a set of symbols or structures, each standing for something - or
representing something - in the represented world.
Representing World
Represented World
Figure 1: The represented and representing worlds, after [Norman 1993] Figure 3.1.
In Figure 1, the "represented world" is shown on the left. The "representing world" is shown to its
right as symbols on a sheet of paper. The representing world is an abstraction and a simplification of
the represented world. In this example, the cube represents the building, and so on. The other aspects
of the real (represented) world are absent from the representing world.
The power of a representation comes from its ability to help us understand the represented world. The
choice of representation makes a dramatic difference in the ease of this task, even though, technically,
the choice does not change the problem. A good representation allows us to model the important
aspects of the represented world.
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The proper choice of representation depends in part upon the mechanism being applied to the problem.
The mechanism consists of procedures and other operations performed on the knowledge that is kept in
the representations, and provides the method we will use to solve problems.
The architecture consists of both the representations and the mechanisms that work with them. The
architecture thus encapsulates the complete problem-solving framework that we use to represent and
reason about the world.
2.2 Philosophical Inspiration: Synthetic Characters Group
The Synthetic Characters group at the MIT Media Lab designs cognitive architectures for autonomous
and semi-autonomous creatures that inhabit graphical worlds. By using ethological models to inform
our design of these intelligent, expressive creatures, we seek to extend the work and philosophy
formulated by Blumberg in [Blumberg 1996]. Previous extensions of the work have considered
observation-based expectation generation [Kline 1999], the use of a character-based architecture for
camera control [Tomlinson 1999], the use of classification techniques within the framework [Ivanov,
Blumberg et al. 2000], extensions to characters' motor systems with applications to music [Downie
2001], and the use of quaternion-based animation blending techniques [Johnson 2001].
The group has recently sought insight into the nature of intelligent behavior by building characters
inspired by the capabilities of dogs. While we still have a long way to go before we implement a perfect
virtual dog, the trying has been very revealing. It has afforded us countless insights into the facets of
intelligence we have yet to emulate, and required us to consider how to organize the many aspects of
intelligence and behavior into a single cognitive architecture.
From a behaviorist's point of view, a focus on a particular species also provides us with a means for
gauging our success. A problem with cartoon-like creatures is that they can behave however we want
them to - there are no rules, and no way to ask "how close did we get?" At the other extreme,
attempting to honestly model all aspects of human intelligence would be setting the bar too high (at this
stage in the game). Later on in this thesis, we are able to examine how the behavior of one of our
virtual creatures compares with the behavior of live subjects in a variety of experiments.
There is a vast amount of literature available on every conceivable aspect of canine existence (Fox
examines social organization in wolves and other canines [Fox 1971]; Wilkes describes dog behavior
and training for pet owners [Wilkes 1994]; Lindsay provides a thorough summary of dog behavior and
training in two volumes [Lindsay 2001a], [Lindsay 2001b].)
Dog training is applied operant conditioning, and a domain in which one sees many of the phenomena
described in lab experiments, but in the context of a whole "behaving" creature. One form of training,
known as "clicker training," involves the use of a handheld device called the "clicker" that makes a
short, sharp clicking noise. This noise serves as a precise event marker for the creature. When
repeatedly followed by a treat, the noise of the clicker becomes associated with a food reinforcer.
Clicker training has been successfully used to train animals ranging from dogs to dolphins (see [Pryor
1999] and [Wilkes 1995]). We will describe clicker training in more detail in Section 4.4.3, when we also
demonstrate how the architecture described by this thesis allows us to perform clicker training on a
virtual creature.
2.3 Architectural Inspiration: Synthetic Characters Cognitive Architecture
The Synthetic Characters group has designed and implemented an agent-based cognitive architecture
that supports the creation of these virtual creatures. By agent-based we mean that the architecture is
composed of many fairly simple components, each of which is individually unintelligent, but through
their interaction they are capable of producing complex cognitive behavior. Most of the agents (or
"Systems") contain their own representations and mechanisms.
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Sensory System
Perception System
Represent the world Working Memory Autonomic Variables
Salient Stimuli
Decide what to do Action and Attention Selection
High-level action requests
Figure out how to do it Navigation and Motor Control
Figure 2: High-level view of the Synthetic Characters cognitive architecture.
We divide the systems in a creature's brain by function into three parts. As depicted in the Figure
above, the first part of the cognitive architecture allows the creature to represent the world. The second
part, which includes the action selection mechanism and its underlying representations, lets a creature
decide what to do. The third part of the brain, which encapsulates navigation and motor control, helps a
creaturefigure out how to implement its action plans.
No part of the architecture exists in isolation. The arrows in the Figure indicate bi-directional flow
between its various components. Not only does our representation of the world help us decide what to
do, but, in return, the action selection mechanism helps us refine how we represent the world.
Similarly, not only do our navigation and motor systems carry out the high-level commands of our
action selection mechanism, but through their operation we can learn things like how long it typically
takes to perform an action.
2.3.1 Representing the World
The creature's ability to represent the external and internal worlds determines its ability to understand
the current context. Many forms of learning are context-specific, in that they involve discovering
important properties of different contexts. There are some contexts in which the creature should
perform certain actions, others in which the creature can reliably predict future events, and yet others
with which the creature associates an affective response. Thus, it is very important that we design
representations that allow a creature to effectively determine its current context.
2.3.1.1 Sensing
A creature should only be able to act on information that its "sensory apparatus" is able to observe. The
Sensory System marks the single entry point for external and proprioceptive sensory information into a
creature's brain. All sensory input from the world is transformed into the creature's coordinate frame
and filtered so that the creature can only receive "biologically plausible" sensory input. Thus, for a
creature in a virtual world, the sensing mechanism acts as the enforcer of sensory honesty.
2.3.1.2 Perception
Once the sensory input has been "sensed," it can then be "perceived" by the creature's Perception
System, which classifies and thus assigns meaning to every nugget of sensory information. The
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external internal
distinction between sensing and perceiving is important. A creature, for example, may "sense" an
acoustic event, but it is up to the perception system to recognize it as an instance of a specific type of
acoustic event that has some meaning to the creature. When the shepherd says "down!" the sheep
perceive it as just another human utterance, but the sheepdog interprets it as an acoustic pattern with a
particular meaning.
an thing
\Zoproceptive
motorActualProprioception
sitPose begPose worldLocation
external
location \\shape
\,eepShape ogShape
utteranceClassifier
downUtterance tUtterance
Figure 3: Part of a creature's Percept Tree.
As illustrated in Figure 3, creatures use a hierarchical arrangement of Percepts, each of which represents
an atomic classification and data-extraction unit. Each Percept's activation level indicates its immediate
or instantaneous response to sensory input. The activation threshold for each Percept (typically some
small e) indicates the activation level above which it is considered active, and the activation decay rate
indicates the rate at which the Percept's activation level decays in the absence of sensory input. In
addition to these properties related to its activation, each Percept is attributed an inherent salience, a
scalar metric that provides a common currency for salience across all Percepts.
The Percept provides a useful level of abstraction for reducing the dimensionality of incoming sensory
information. An arbitrarily complex mechanism tucked into a Percept can determine whether or not it
matches a particular sensory input. The current architecture contains examples of very simple
matching mechanisms - for example, a string token mechanism for matching shapes in the virtual
world - and also more complex mechanisms - for example, the acoustic pattern matcher, described in
Appendix A, which interprets sound input.
Some Percepts are adaptive, using statistical models to characterize and refine their response
properties. These Percepts can not only modulate their "receptive fields" (the space of inputs for which
they will activate) but also, in concert with the action selection mechanism, modify the topology of the
Percept Tree itself, producing an evolving hierarchy of children in a process called perceptual innovation.
In general, Percepts are only prompted to perform perceptual innovation when the action-selection
mechanism is fairly confident that this will allow the creature to make better decisions.
We emphasize here the importance of Percepts in determining the current context. Modifying the
topology of the tree can allow the creature to represent different contexts in the world. Adding child
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Percepts that represent increasingly specific perceptual responses lets the creature differentiate between
increasingly specificfeatures in the world.
2.3.1.3 Object Representation
Percepts reduce the dimensionality of incoming sensory information by transforming that information
into features of the world that are meaningful to a creature. The creature also needs some sort of
representation that matches features of differing modalities (visual, acoustic, etc.) by combining and
identifying them together as an object. Such a mechanism would allow us to solve (or at least avoid) the
perceptual binding problem, described by Treisman in [Treisman 1998].
We call our object representation a Belief. All of the Percept activity generated by each object in the
world is stored together as a Belief in Working Memory. Each Belief, as depicted in Figure 4, consists of
a history of each Percept's activation level as it pertains to that object in the world - in other words, it
contains a history of which features recently appeared in which objects.
On timesteps in which no new information for a given Percept is observed, the confidence level of that
Percept in the particular Belief is decayed. The rate of decay is determined in part by the Percept's
activation decay rate. For example, confidence in another creature's location might decay rapidly
without observation, but confidence in its shape probably should not.
Duncan H Terrier's Belief representing the Shepherd
location
shepherdShape -
sitGesture
sitSound - activation level
-- o
time -
Duncan perceives that the shepherd said "sit" here
Figure 4: A Belief contains a history of how an object in the world activated each Percept.
An object representation allows us to query our memory in useful ways. Behaviors can be triggered by
asking questions like, "is there food near me?" Action-targets can be picked by finding the "red object
that is making the most noise." "Find an object that is humanoid-shaped and go to it" implies that you
can extract both shape and location information out of a representation of an object. The Belief in
Figure 4 is another creature's representation of the Shepherd. This creature, Duncan the terrier, believes
the Shepherd just made the sit gesture, and then made an utterance that sounded like the word "sit."
2.3.2 Action Selection, Attention Selection
The action selection mechanism takes the creature's representations of the internal and external worlds,
and uses the information they contain to arrive at a high-level plan that consists of three parts: a desired
action, a desired target for that action, and the creature's currentfocus of attention.
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2.3.3 Locomotion and Interaction
The creature carries out the high-level requests generated by the action selection mechanism by using
its capacity for navigation and motor control to locomote around and interact with the world.
2.3.3.1 Separating Navigation from Action Selection
A separate Navigation System provides large-scale spatial competencies, usually by overriding motor
requests passed down by the action selection mechanism to cause locomotion around the environment.
This relieves the action selection mechanism of the burden of implementing the decisions it makes.
Ultimately, the majority of animal behaviors follow the "approach, orient and do" model, and a
separate navigation competence allows the action selection mechanism to concern itself with higher-
level atoms.
2.3.3.2 Generating Expressive Motion
The Motor System is responsible for performing locomotion, a variety of actions, and orienting the eyes,
heads, and bodies of creatures. Throughout all of a creature's motion, it should remain "in character,"
using cues from its motivational and affective state. In The Illusion of Life, Thomas and Johnson explain
there is no such thing as just a "walk cycle." [Thomas, Johnson 1981] There is a happy walk, a sad walk,
an excited walk, and so on. This notion - that an animation consists of both a Verb and an Adverb - is
captured in the work of Rose et al [Rose, Cohen et al. 1999] that inspired our Motor System design. For
more information about these and other Motor System issues, the reader is referred to [Rose, Cohen et
al. 1999], [Downie 2001] and [Johnson 1999].
2.3.4 Summary
The Synthetic Characters architecture is very good at simulating virtual creatures that inhabit graphical
worlds. The creatures are able to sense and perceive their worlds, and perform actions informed by
those perceptions that help satisfy their drives (which we will discuss shortly in Section 3.1). They are
even able to learn via a training technique based on applied operant conditioning. For the curious, a
more detailed discussion of the layered brain architecture and training technique is found in [Isla,
Burke et al. 2001], and even more implementation detail is found in [Burke, Isla et al. 2001].
One thing this architecture does not provide the creatures with is a representation of apparent temporal
causality. If it did, creatures would be able to predict the onset of future events and thus plan for the
future. Based on their understanding of apparent causality, they could perform actions explicitly
intending to change the world in some way. They could expect an event at some future time, and react
appropriately if that event does not occur.
We turn now to ethology, the study of animal behavior, for one model that may allow us to provide our
creatures with some of this understanding.
2.4 Ethological Inspiration: Time, Rate and Conditioning
There are many reasons why we take classical ethology as an inspiration for the design of autonomous
virtual creatures [Blumberg 1996]. By studying how animals behave and adapt in their natural
environments, many ethologists like McFarland, Ludlow and Gallistel adopt the level of abstraction at
which we would like to synthesize behavior (see [McFarland 1993], [Ludlow 1976], [Gallistel 1990]).
Like ethologists, we are less concerned with how particular representations might be implemented at
the level of neurons. Instead, like Minsky in his influential book Society of Mind [Minsky 1985], we are
more concerned with how to organize and implement higher-level structures in the brain. As we saw
in the previous subsection, we design systems and representations at the levels of perception, action
selection, navigation and motor control. The interplay of many such simple systems might reproduce
the wide variety of complex behavior that can be observed in nature.
22 It's about Time: Temporal Representations for Synthetic Characters
2.4.1 Time, Rate and Conditioning Representations
Because of the success they had elegantly incorporating knowledge of time and rate into a
computational model, we found inspiration for our implementation of apparent temporal causality in
Gallistel and Gibbon's Time, Rate and Conditioning [Gallistel, Gibbon 20001. In that article, the authors
detail two theories that account for a broad range of conditioning phenomena. These theories depend
on an animal's ability to learn temporal intervals between events, as well as rates of reinforcement. In
Scalar Expectancy Theory, animals store in memory the reinforcement latency (the time between the
onset of a stimulus and a subsequent reward signal). In Rate Estimation Theory, they store the rates of
reinforcement for stimuli. The authors contrast their paradigms with the existing associative paradigms,
and present a veritable library of experimental data to support their claims. What is exciting about the
model is that by assuming the existence of representations for time and rate, Gallistel and Gibbon are
able to easily explain a wide range of disparate conditioning phenomena.
2.4.1.1 Experimental Paradigm
One main goal of behaviorism is the identification of basic learning processes that can be described in
terms of stimuli and responses. The experimental paradigm that underlies the study of conditioning is
one in which the subject is presented with various stimuli. The subject learns associations between the
stimuli. These associations often involve responses made by the animal when it perceives a stimulus.
Before Conditioning
Neutral stimulus (bell) No response
Unconditioned stimulus (food) Unconditioned Response (salivation)
During Conditioning
Neutral stimulus (bell) - Unconditioned stimulus (food) -+ Unconditioned Response (salivation)
After Conditioning
Conditioned Stimulus (bell) * Conditioned Response (salivation)
Figure 5: Classical conditioning procedure.
Pavlovian or Classical conditioning is an association-forming process by which a stimulus that
previously did not elicit a response comes to elicit a response, in reflex-like fashion, after it is paired for
one or more trials with a stimulus that already elicits a response. As shown in the above Figure, a
neutral stimulus is initially demonstrated not to elicit a response. After it is paired for several trials
with an unconditioned stimulus (abbreviated US), it becomes a conditioned stimulus (CS) and does elicit a
conditioned response (CR).
Before Conditioning
Neutral stimulus (bell) No response
During Conditioning
Neutral stimulus (bell) + Unconditioned Response (sitting) - Unconditioned Stimulus (food)
After Conditioning
Conditioned Stimulus (bell) Conditioned Response (sit)
Figure 6: Operant conditioning procedure.
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Operant or Instrumental conditioning is a process through which the consequences of a response
increase or decrease the likelihood that the response will occur again. In one such procedure, the
subject learns that performing a certain behavior in a context results in a reinforcer such as food. In
accordance with Thorndike's Law of Effect, responses that produce a satisfying effect in a particular
situation become more likely to occur again in that situation, and responses that produce a
discomforting effect become less likely to occur again in that situation (see [Thorndike 1911]).
Most contemporary associative theorists no longer assume that the association-forming processes in
classical and operant conditioning are fundamentally different. Rather, they are thought to give rise to
different associative structures via a single association-forming process.
2.4.1.2 Scalar Expectancy Theory: the "When" decision
Scalar Expectancy Theory, or SET, pertains to the onset of the conditioned response (CR) following a
stimulus onset, revealing both "when" and "for how long" the CR should occur. It explains how a
subject's uncertainty about the "true value" of a remembered length of an interval is proportional to the
length of that interval. The results produced by SET correlate with some well-established facts about
how subjects time the duration between two events:
* First, the conditioned response (which suggests the expectation of the second event) is
maximally likely at the reinforcement latency. When there is a fixed interval between two
events - for example, a marking event and the delivery of a reinforcement - the probability
that a well-trained subject will make a conditioned response increases as the interval between
events approaches, reaching a maximum at the interval length.
* Second, the distribution of Conditioned Response onsets and offsets is scalar, and thus the
temporal distribution of CR initiations and terminations is time scale invariant. In other words,
when one signal seems to predict a future event, the approximate size of the window in which
a subject expects that event to occur increases as the length of the interval between the events
increases.
The components of the Scalar Expectancy Theory model include (1) a timing mechanism, (2) a memory
mechanism, (3) sources of variability or noise in the decision variables, and (4) a comparison
mechanism adapted to that noise. At the onset of the conditioned stimulus (CS), the timing mechanism
generates a signal that is proportional at every moment to the elapsed duration of the subject's current
exposure to the CS. This quantity represents the subject's measure of the duration of an elapsing
interval. The timer is reset to zero by the onset of a reinforcer or other unconditioned stimulus (US) that
marks the end of the interval. The magnitude of the timing signal at the time the timer is reset is
written to reference memory through a multiplicative translation variable k*, whose expected value is
close to but not identically one. This effect, known as k* error, causes the recorded interval to deviate
from the timed value by some generally small percentage.
When the CS reappears (marking the beginning of a new trial), a new timing mechanism generates a
signal, the subjective duration of which is compared to the remembered reinforcement delay in
memory. The comparison takes the form of a ratio that is called the decision variable. When this ratio
exceeds a threshold - Pi somewhat less than 1 - the animal responds to the CS, provided it has had
sufficient experience with the CS to have already decided that it is a reliable predictor of the US. If the
expected US does not occur, the conditioned response ceases to occur when the decision ratio exceeds a
second threshold P2 somewhat greater than 1. In other words, the subject begins to respond when it
estimates that the currently elapsing interval is close to the remembered interval. If the US does not
appear, the subject stops responding when it estimates that the currently elapsing interval is sufficiently
past the remembered interval. The p decision thresholds constitute the criteria for "close" and "past."
The measure of closeness is the ratio between the currently elapsing interval, and the remembered
interval.
A diagram might help here.
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CS Perceived? r
Subjective Timet
t,
Timer
Timer Memory
0 T 0 e
Objective Time
Reference Memory
- k*tr= t*7
Response Decision Yes CR
No CR
Figure 7: Flow diagram for Scalar Expectancy Theory, explaining the timing of an animal's conditioned response.
After [Gallistel, Gibbon 2000], Figure 3.
In Figure 7, we see how Scalar Expectancy Theory handles two trials. Each trial involves the activation
of a timing mechanism (left side of Figure). The first trial was reinforced at time T (the circle on the
timeline), and the second trial is still elapsing at time e. When the first trial was reinforced, the
cumulated subjective time, tr, was stored in Timer Memory and transferred to Reference Memory via a
multiplicative variable k*, thus producing the so-called k* error and encoding the remembered interval
t*=k*tr. The subject decides when to respond by using the ratio of the elapsing interval in Timer
Memory (te) to the remembered interval in reference Memory (t*). When the ratio exceeds a threshold,
P1, which is dose to but generally less than 1, the subject responds.
To summarize, Scalar Estimation Theory employs two assumptions to explain scale invariance in the
distribution of conditioned responses:
* The decision variable used to determine when to respond takes the form of a ratio te/t*, the
denominator of which, te, is the learned interval length; and the numerator of which, t*, is the
elapsed time since the conditioned stimulus.
* Estimates of duration read from memory have scalar variability.
2.4.1.3 Rate Estimation Theory: the "Whether" decision
Scalar Estimation Theory assumes that the animal has already determined whether or not a stimulus
merits a response. In the Rate Estimation Theory model, this decision is based on an animal's growing
certainty that a stimulus has a substantial effect on the rate of reinforcement. In simple conditioning, this
appears to be determined "by the subject's estimate of the maximum possible value of the rate of
background reinforcement given its experience of the background up to a given point in conditioning."
[Gallistel, Gibbon 2000] Gallistel and Gibbon provide a computational model for how animals
determine the true rates of reinforcement for each stimulus and use this to determine whether or not a
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stimulus merits response. They demonstrate how this model accounts for experiments that employ
fixed and variable rates of reinforcement.
Conditioning to one stimulus does not proceed independently of conditioning that occurs to other
stimuli. Rate Estimation Theory provides an explanation for cue competition phenomena based on two
principles: rate additivity and the principle of parsimony.
Temporal Coefficient Matrix Inverted Matrices Potential Solution Vectors Predictor Minimization
Pairwise time totals t12 tn
t iji j ti ti
t12 t2n
-- IXI|- Kmin
Individual time totals
iv i ti t2nt t
ti
Sr2 ~1
Individual reinforcement totals
r.V i - '
Raw Rate Vector
Figure 8: Functional structure of the computational process that underlies Rate Estimation Theory.
After [Gallistel, Gibbon 2000], Figure 18.
For each stimulus, the subject stores individual time totals (ti) and pairwise time totals (tij) in the temporal
coefficient matrix (as shown in Figure 8). The raw rate vector consists of the rate estimates made by
ignoring other stimuli and simply dividing the cumulative exposure to each stimulus (ti) by the number
of reinforcements obtained in the presence of that stimulus (ri).
The creature arrives at the corrected or true rates of reinforcement (Ai) by inverting the temporal coefficient
matrix and multiplying the inverse by the raw rate vector. If there are redundant stimuli, the
determinant of the temporal coefficient matrix will be 0 and thus its inverse undefined. In this case,
redundant stimuli are removed from the matrix to create lower-order matrices representing systems of
equations that ignore one or more stimuli. The principle of predictor minimization (or more generally,
the principle of parsimony) determines which of the lower-order solutions is taken as the "correct"
solution: it is the solution that minimizes the sum of the absolute values of the predicted rates. Thus the
creature arrives at the true rate of reinforcement for stimuli.
Rate additivity is implicit in the structure of the mechanism used by Rate Estimation Theory to compute
the rates of reinforcement that are credited to each of the experimentally manipulated stimuli. The
principle of parsimony - essentially Occam's razor - is invoked for cases where the principle of rate
additivity does not determine a unique solution to the rate estimation problem. Mathematical details of
the partitioning model are available in the appendices of [Gallistel, Gibbon 2000].
2.5 Summary of Our Goal
The Synthetic Characters cognitive architecture is very good at integrating several kinds of learning into
an autonomous virtual creature that can often maintain the illusion of life. Scalar Expectancy Theory
and Rate Estimation Theory succinctly explain the results of a wide variety of conditioning
experiments. Perhaps most importantly, they explain how an animal can employ its ability to
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remember the temporal interval between stimuli to predict a future event, and how an animal can
decide which stimuli are worth responding to.
Our goal is to integrate aspects of Gallistel and Gibbon's computational model into the existing
architecture. The resulting hybrid should allow us to build virtual creatures that are capable of learning
apparent temporal causality relationships. The system will require a new action selection mechanism
that allows the creature to take advantage of its understanding of causality.
The previous cognitive architecture could be said to integrate an analysis of the past with an ability to
react to the present. With the new architecture, we seek to include an ability to predict the future. Thus
a creature could be informed by salient stimuli perceived in the recent past, reactive to stimuli perceived
in the present, and able to plan appropriately for the stimuli predicted to appear in the future.
We seek to preserve many of the qualities that make the existing system good, such as its modular
nature, its capacity for intuitive behavior design, and its ability to reproduce operant conditioning
phenomena. The new augmentations should further our ability to create robust creatures that are able
to adapt to and learn in a dynamic environment.
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3.0 Cognitive Architecture
We can't just provide creatures with a representation for apparent temporal causality and expect it to
make their lives better. We need to consider how a creature might use apparent causality knowledge to
influence its action selection and help satisfy its internal needs.
Thus we begin this Section with the notion that a creature has needs that it must satisfy. The goal of the
action selection mechanism is to explore, exploit and react to the world in a way that lets the creature
satisfy those needs.
One thing that will help the creature perform this task better is the ability to learn from the past to
predict the future. This implies that we can give the creature a means for predicting future events - one
thing it would gain from an ethologically-inspired model of apparent temporal causality. We thus
introduce the action selection mechanism and the representation of apparent temporal causality, and
show how the two are integrated. We conclude the Section by showing how affective responses can be
generated using our understanding of apparent temporal causality.
Mathematical details for many of the mechanisms described in this Section are found in Appendix B.
3.1 Creatures must satisfy Internal Needs
We begin with the notion that creatures have internal needs that they must satisfy. A creature's needs
are a subset of the internal state that we need to represent.
Our atomic component of internal representation is the Autonomic Variable. Autonomic Variables each
produce a continuous scalar-valued quantity. Most Autonomic Variables have drift points - values that
they drift toward in the absence of any other input.
3.1.1 Drives represent Needs
Some of the creature's Autonomic Variables represent Drives, like the hunger drive depicted in the
Figure below. In addition to its drift point, each Drive also has a set point, the value at which the drive
is considered satisfied. The strength of the drive is proportional to the magnitude of the difference
between the set point and the output value.
0.0 (set oint) 0.8 (drift oint)
N' 0.4 (scalar output)
hunger
0.4 1.0
Figure 9: An Autonomic Variable, the atomic component of internal representation.
Associated with each Drive is a scalar drive multiplier that allows the creature to compare the
importance of various drives. Over the course of a creature's existence, these multipliers might change,
so that the creature can favor different drives at different times. This mechanism can be used to create
periodic changes in the creature's drives (for example, to produce a circadian rhythm) and induce
drive-based developmental growth over a creature's lifespan.
Take the output of all the Autonomic Variables that represent Drives, and concatenate their scalar
output values into a vector, and we have the DriveVector - a summary of the creature's current drive
state. As depicted in the following Figure, each component of the DriveVector indicates the state of a
particular Drive, and the entire DriveVector summarizes the creature's current needs.
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drive multipliers creature's current DriveVector
hunger
pain avoidance
curiosity
0.4
0.4 l
x 30
x 20 -
x 25
Figure 10: Three drives, their drive multipliers, and the resulting DriveVector.
This has ramifications on the way our creatures represent "value" or "goodness." Many machine
learning algorithms use a single-dimensional "utility" value that describes something's general
goodness. But by itself, an "affective tag" like this does not reflect how something's utility changes as
the creature's drives change.
Instead, our creatures represent the value of something in the world - whether it is an action, a fellow
creature, or an object - as a "value vector" with the same dimensions as the DriveVector. That vector
indicates how the creature believes that thing will affect its drives.
The utility of something in the world at a given moment can be reduced to a scalar value by taking the
dot product of the thing's value vector with the creature's DriveVector, as shown in Figure 11. The
result of this approach, which parallels the motivational model described by Spier in [Spier 1997], is
that the utility of something in the creature's world reflects the creature's current drive state. Please
note that the set point for each Drive in this discussion is zero. Thus, positive drive output values indicate the
magnitude of the creature's drive away from a zero set point. Negative utility values indicate something
useful to the creature, because that thing has the perceived effect of reducing the creature's drives.
creature's current DriveVector
hunger
pain avoidance
curiosity
hunger
pain avoidance
curiosity
intrinsic value of 'kick shed' action
-10
20
-3
-10
20
-3
utility
b 35
(not such a good thing)
-35
(a good thing)
Figure 11: The utility of an action varies with the creature's current DriveVector.
The creature described in Figure 11 has three drives: hunger, pain avoidance, and curiosity. These are
concatenated into a three-dimensional DriveVector I di d2 d3I (left side of Figure). The creature's food
source is a shed in which there are sleeping sheep. If he rattles the shed, the sheep will scatter and he
can feast. However, the shed is surrounded by an electrified fence. Thus, in order to rattle the shed, the
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current drive values
-00 --*
-D. -+0.
creature will have to sustain a shock, which will hurt a whole lot. Thus, the value of the "kick the shed"
action (middle of Figure) might look like [-10 20 -3] relative to his drives [hunger, pain, curiosity],
meaning that it will reduce his hunger drive (good), increase his pain (bad), and slightly lower his
curiosity drive (because kicking stuff is intriguing). If this unnamed creature's current drives are [5 5 5],
then the value of kicking the shed is [5 5 51 - [-10 20 -3] or 35, a positive number suggesting that, overall,
the action will not be such a good thing. But, in the absence of other food sources, the creature's drives
might eventually drift to [10 4 5] for [hunger pain dominate]. Now he's hungrier and isn't in quite as
much pain. The dot product of [10 4 5] and [-10 20 -3] generates a utility of -35; in other words, an
effective strategy for satisfying the current drives. (We note that this example is functionally analogous
to a more mundane experiment wherein a rat is presented with a lever, surrounded by an electrified
floor pad, which causes food pellets to be dispensed when pressed.)
For the purposes of the action selection mechanism that follows, and as seen in this example, a special
drive called curiosity is added to each of the creatures. Curiosity tends to drift up over time, and drop
back down as the creature does interesting things. As we will see when we discuss action selection,
treating curiosity as a first-class drive is very effective for producing exploratory behavior.
3.1.2 Drives are satisfied by performing actions or consuming resources
There are number of ways that we can model effects on a creature's drives. Lorenz and Leyhausen
posit in [Lorenz, Leyhausen 1973] that creatures find it inherently satisfying to perform particular
actions and consume resources. When either of those conditions are met (the creature consumes food,
comes in contact with an electric shock, enters an action state it finds inherently rewarding, or whatever
else), the values of the corresponding Autonomic Variables are automatically updated.
3.1.3 Represent Drives with Various Levels of Abstraction
It is possible to use Autonomic Variables to model higher- or lower-level abstractions of the creature's
internal state. For example, we could model a low-level representation of "chemicals" that are added to
a creature's "bloodstream," much like the system used to create Cyberlife's Creatures [Cyberlife 1998].
Or, Autonomic Variables can model higher-level concepts, such as the desire to dominate other
creatures, by generating an Autonomic Variable that represents the result of a function of other
Autonomic Variables. A learning mechanism installed here would allow us to emulate the intriguing
technique employed by the titans in Lionhead's Black and White, who use a form of perceptron training
to learn which drives should propel them to pursue which consummatory actions [Evans 2001].
3.1.4 Affective Variables represent Emotional State
Autonomic Variables are also used to model the creature's emotional state. We have worked with
several models of affect that create a multidimensional "affective space." Each axis of the space is
represented by an Autonomic Variable we call an Affective Variable. Yoon describes the three-axis
stance-valence-arousal model in [Yoon, Blumberg et al. 2000] that was inspired by Russell [Russell
1980]. Outputs from these axes can be mapped into less rudimentary affective states, such as the seven
primary emotional states suggested by Ekman in [Ekman 1982]: surprise, interest, anger,
disgust/contempt, happiness, sadness and fear.
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unhappy, happy,
aroused aroused
(alarmed) (alert)
arousal
unhappy, happy,
unaroused unaroused
(lethargic) (complacent)
affective stance
Figure 12: Simple two-axis emotional space, after [Russell 1980].
The creatures described in this document use the two-axis emotional space shown in Figure 12 which
consists of an arousal axis, and an affective stance axis that integrates aspects of Yoon's stance and
valence, restoring a two-axis model very similar to that proposed by Russell. (Russell calls the affective
stance axis "pleasure" in [Russell 1980].)
3.2 The fundamental action selection choice: explore, exploit or react.
Now that we've established how creatures represent the needs that they must satisfy, we can discuss
the action selection mechanism that helps them satisfy those needs. The fundamental choice a creature
must make at every moment is whether to exploit its knowledge about the world, explore the world to
possibly discover new things, or react to recently-observed stimuli.
The action selection mechanism that will integrate these explore, exploit and react operations should
exhibit the qualities suggested by Brooks in [Brooks 1991a]. Every action performed by the creature
should appear (and be) relevant. It should make sense, given the creature's internal state, its perceptions
of its environment, its knowledge of how the world works, and its repertoire of actions. The creature's
behavior should have a high degree of persistence and coherence, in that the creature should be aware of
the appropriate duration of its actions and see them through to completion, without getting stuck in
"mindless loops." The selection mechanism itself should be capable of learning and adaptation, and
facilitate learning in other parts of the creature's brain.
Our task is complicated by the fact that the action selection mechanism we want is not purely reactive.
We would like the mechanism to be informed by salient stimuli perceived in the recent past, reactive to
stimuli perceived in the present, and able to plan appropriately for stimuli predicted to appear in the
future.
We need a representation that can integrate the past, present and future, offering a creature an
understanding of the passage of time.
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I perceived event
perceived event
the past eow , the future
now Ipredicted event
Figure 13: The TimeLine representation integrates past, present and future events.
This representation is the TimeLine. The creature uses it to maintain a list of salient events - both those
perceived in the past and those predicted for the future - arranged on a temporal axis. The observation
of a salient stimulus causes a Perception event to be posted to the TimeLine. In response to Perception
events, a creature can use its understanding of cause and effect to add Prediction events to the TimeLine.
A Prediction event includes the stimulus that is predicted, the time window in which the onset is
predicted to occur, and the Predictor (discussed below) that caused the prediction to appear.
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Figure 14: How the action selection mechanism integrates the explore, exploit, react and startle operations.
34 It's about Time: Temporal Representations for Synthetic Characters
S2
4
3.2.1 Overview
The previous Figure illustrates how the action selection mechanism integrates the explore, exploit, react
and startle operations. On every timestep, we first check if the creature needs to perform a reflex or
startle action ((1) in the diagram). If not, we check if the active action is completed (2). If so, the creature
selects a drive on the basis of their relative magnitudes (3). If the curiosity drive is chosen, the creature
performs an explore operation. If any other drive is chosen (or the explore operation fails to select a new
action), the creature performs an exploit operation, which is guaranteed to select a new desired action.
Next, the react operation is performed on any newly salient stimuli, potentially causing the focus of
attention and desired action to change (4).
At the end of the timestep, the mechanism has in fact made three selections: it has chosen the desired
action, the object of attention, and the target object. The desired action is a high-level token like "sit," "kick"
or "approach" that describes what the creature would like to do. The target object is the object on which
the desired action should be performed. The object of attention represents the creature's focus of
attention. Each of these three selections is "winner take all," in that they are made to the exclusion of all
other options for this timestep.
An example should illustrate the difference between the target object and object of attention. Suppose
the creature is a dog that is running around a sheep. Then both his target object and his object of
attention would be the sheep around which he's running. But further suppose his shepherd is shouting
"Sit! Sit! C'mon boy, sit!" which he is choosing to ignore. This belligerent canine might acknowledge
the (increasingly frenetic) vocalization by setting his object of attention to his master, thus causing his
Motor System to dart a glance over his shoulder in the direction of the shouting. But because his target
object remains the sheep, he'll still run around the sheep (and not start running around the shepherd).
We now describe the exploit, explore and reaction operations in more detail. These operations are
supported by three special action states: approach, avoid, and observe, that represent different reactions a
creature might have to a stimulus (either perceived or predicted).
Once again, although we are light on mathematical details in this section, a summary of operations is
found in Appendix B.
3.2.2 Exploit
The exploit operation causes the creature to use its knowledge about the world to select an action it
believes will help satisfy its drives. This may mean performing a consummatory action, or performing
an appetitive action that the creature predicts will move it closer to performing a consummatory action.
The creature can exploit by using its direct perceptions of the world to choose a new action state with a
high utility.
Or, the creature can exploit by reacting to something it predicts is about to happen. If a painful
stimulus is almost certainly about to appear, it should be avoided if at all possible. Similarly, if a
stimulus about to appear will facilitate a consummatory action, the best course of action might be to
approach the stimulus in preparation for its arrival. These represent preventative and preparatory action
states.
One useful property of the drive-based utility metric described in Section 3.1 is that it can be reduced to
a scalar value that represents common value currency for different things in the world. In this case, we
can use that currency to compare two kinds of action states: those triggered by perceptions, and
preventative and preparatory action states that are triggered by predictions.
The scalar utility values obtained using both methods are used as input for a histogram probability
distribution, from which the creature selects a single course of action in a winner-takes-all decision. A
distribution is used here to heavily favor options with high magnitude values. The function used to
map utility values to the histogram provides a useful degree of freedom representing "curiosity" that
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can be used to tweak the creature's propensity to exploit the very best option. The spirit of this
mechanism is to typically cause the creature to select the very best available option, while still
occasionally selecting another option that seems very promising but not necessarily the "best."
3.2.3 Explore
There are many ways a creature can explore its world. It can redirect its attention toward an interesting
object. It can explore that interesting object by performing actions on it; perhaps randomly, or perhaps
by selecting actions that produced useful results for similar objects. It can select an action state because
that state is interesting, rather than obviously useful. It can test predicting mechanisms in which it has
low confidence, possibly by generalizing and discriminating the trigger contexts that cause them to
make predictions. There are sufficiently many exploration techniques that, instead of peppering them
throughout the action selection mechanism, we formalize our notion of exploration by encapsulating its
many forms within the explore operation.
Like the exploit operation, the explore operation should end with the selection of the creature's next
desired action state. However, unlike exploit, which culminates in a single action selection guided by a
probability distribution, the explore operation requires at least two different selections. First, Attention
Selection chooses an interesting target object for the creature. Next, Drive Selection chooses the drive that
will guide exploration. Finally, depending on the result of these two selections, the creature may
perform Strategy Selection to choose the exploration strategy it will use to select its next action state.
Let's examine each of these Selections in more detail.
The process begins at Attention Selection with the creature choosing the object it will use as the target for
exploration. Objects are selected on the basis of their "level of interest," an arbitrarily complex metric.
In the current implementation, a creature's interest in an object tends to drift upward over time, decline
when the object is the creature's focus of attention, and increase when unusual or salient perceptual
activity is detected within the object. The creature's current object of attention is given preference, as
are objects that are spatially proximate to the creature.
The creature now performs Drive Selection to decide what it's going to do with its newly acquired Object
of Attention. A drive is selected probabilistically on the basis of its magnitude. If the drive selected is
not the curiosity drive, the creature activates the previously-selected action state, setting the new Object
of Attention to be its Target Object. As a result, the creature explores an interesting object in the world
using existing techniques.
However, if Drive Selection returns the curiosity drive, the creature performs Strategy Selection, invoking
more complex forms of exploration that possibly involve generating new action states. A number of
strategies are possible here, including generalizing and discriminating the contexts in which the
creature performs various actions.
3.2.4 React
The react operation gives the creature a chance to interrupt its current behavior and react to the
perception of a salient stimulus.
The first thing a creature does when it perceives a salient stimulus - for example, a loud noise - is to try
to explain it, by looking at the TimeLine for a prediction of the event. The creature's affective response
will be largely determined by whether or not this event was predicted, and which action states, good or
bad, the event will facilitate.
The creature may choose to interrupt its current behavior in favor of one that provides a reaction to the
stimulus. Depending on the utility of the action states that the stimulus facilitates, the appropriate
reaction may be to approach, observe or avoid it. Or, it may be to perform an action that is directly
facilitated by the presence of this stimulus. The creature must decide whether to interrupt its current
action to pursue one of these responses, again weighting the decision so that the currently active action
will tend to persist unless a new option is significantly better.
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If the creature can't explain the appearance of a stimulus, it is given an opportunity to invent an
explanation for why it appeared, marking the beginnings of the apparent temporal causality process we
will discuss in Section 3.3. For further discussion of "explaining away" unexpected events using
probabilistic reasoning, see [Pearl 1988].
3.2.5 Startle (Reflex actions)
Sometimes, the creature must react to a stimulus with a reflex action more sudden and unstoppable than
the mechanism provided by the react operation. The basic idea is that sometimes, due to constraints
beyond the creature's control, the action selection mechanism must interrupt its current behavior to do
something outside of behavioral control. A deafening noise unexpectedly occurring behind the
creature should cause such a "startle" response. Similarly, coming in contact with a potent enough
electric shock will cause the creature to convulse involuntarily. The action selection mechanism checks
if it must initiate any such "startle" before performing one of the explore, exploit or react operations.
3.2.6 Action Selection Summary
The explore, exploit and react operations describe the approach the creature uses from moment to
moment to explore the world, exploit knowledge about the world, and react to salient stimuli. In the
next section, we will see how these operations guide the creature's attempts to learn how the world
works.
3.3 Apparent Temporal Causality: What, Why and How?
The explore, exploit and react operations assume that the creature has the ability to represent apparent
temporal causality relationships. But first things first: what do we mean by apparent temporal causality
relationships? They are cause-and-effect relationships that a creature believes it has discovered about its
world. They are apparent, because they are how the world appears to work to the character, whether or
not the world really works that way. They are temporal, because cause and effect are somehow related
in time. And they represent causality, in that the creature can use them to generalize from specific
examples to try to arrive at general principles about how the world works. Similar temporal logic, as
surveyed by de Kleer in [deKleer, Brown 1986], has been used in the past to extend the problem solving
abilities of traditional planning systems (see [Allen 1991], [Iwasaki, Simon 1986] and [deKleer 1986]).
As noted by Moray in [Moray 1990], four kinds of cause have classically distinguished (with classically
meaning in the sense of going back at least to Aristotle). A switch may cause a pump to operate
because it is in the "on" position (formal cause), because it closes a pair of contacts (material cause),
because it allows current to flow through the pump (efficient cause), or because we need cooling (final
cause). In this thesis we are discussing an attempt to learn about formal causality, although extending
this work to consider the other forms of causality is an intriguing prospect.
While some causality relationships can be specified a priori, many others must be learned during the
creature's lifetime. To learn these relationships, the creature needs to collect statistical information
about its sensory input. It needs to filter its representation of the world state and consider only the
most interesting things it perceives. It then needs to discover apparent temporal causality relationships
in those perceptions, and use that knowledge to inform its action selection decisions. While performing
action selection, the creature needs to reinforce prediction mechanisms that are doing a good job, and
refine or remove those that are unreliable.
In Section 3.3, we consider what it will take to build a creature that does these things, and as a result
makes use of apparent temporal causality.
3.3.1 First of all, we represent Stimuli
A Stimulus is a signal provider in the creature's brain that can serve as a component of an apparent
temporal causality relationship. The stimulus can thus represent a wide range of potential signals, from
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Percepts indicating external world state, to some component of self-action, or an Autonomic Variable
representing a facet of the creature's internal state.
We ask that any signal provider that backs a stimulus also provide an activation threshold. Much
discussion in behavioral psychology revolves around the animal's perception of the "onset" and
"offset" of a stimulus, suggesting that at some point, the creature distinguishes between the boolean
presence or nonpresence of a stimulus. Thus, any object that will be used to back a stimulus must be
capable of indicating whether or not it is currently active.
\gJ bellSoundPerceptActivation
Figure 15: How stimuli are depicted in this document. The onset of the depicted stimulus occurs when the
activation level of the bellSound Percept is above a threshold.
In order to discover apparent temporal causality relationships, we will need to keep some statistics
about the relationships between stimuli. For example, in order to implement Rate Estimation Theory as
proposed by Gallistel and Gibbon, we generate the temporal concurrence matrix, which consists of the
cumulative duration of the conjunction of each pair of stimuli. In principle, this is sufficient to
implement RET, as it allows us to compute the true rate of reinforcement for any stimulus using the
technique described in Section 2.4.1.3. However, as we shall see later on, our implementation uses
heuristics to approximate many of the underlying principles of RET.
3.3.2 Predictors represent apparent temporal causality relationships
Now that we have a means for representing stimuli, we need a way to represent apparent temporal
causality relationships between those stimuli. We introduce the Predictor, our representation for a
nugget of apparent causality information, which provides the basic unit of prediction in the system.
Predicted Event (future stimulus onset)
Predicted Interval
Predictor Context
goodTrials
badTrials context statistics -- reliable stimuli for refining context
explainedTrials
trial management stimulus reliability stats
Predictor tla19ter
satisfies Predictor Context
generates Prediction event
perceived event
Time ine (predicted event
TimeLine
Figure 16:- A Predictor interacting with the TimeLine.
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A Predictor represents an apparent temporal causality relationship by recording the perceived interval
between two events. The first event is recorded as the Predictor Context that consists of one or many
stimuli denoting both external and internal context. The second event is recorded as the Predicted Event
that is expected to occur in the future, after the Predicted Interval, whenever the Predictor Context is
perceived.
In Figure 16 we see the basic interaction between a Predictor and the TimeLine: when an event occurs
that causes all of the stimuli that comprise the Predictor Context to become concurrently active, the
Predictor begins a Trial, causing the prediction of a future event. Just as a Predictor is analogous to SET's
Reference Memory because it stores the perceived interval between two events, a Trial is analogous to an
instance of SET's timing mechanism, in that it represents an individual prediction that the Predicted Event
will occur, with a given reliability, during a particular time window. Also directly analogous to Scalar
Expectancy Theory, the size of the time window during which the event is predicted to occur is determined
simply by a scalar function of the Predicted Interval. The importance of this property is depicted in Figure
17, where two Predictors with significantly differing Predicted Intervals produce predictions of events
that are expected to occur within time windows of substantially different size.
In the Figure, the perceived event at the present time satisfies the Predictor Context for the two
(unrelated) Predictors. Each of them begins a Trial, resulting in the prediction of two future events after
their two Predicted Intervals. The Predicted Interval for Predictor 2 is twice the length of the Predicted
Interval for Predictor 1, and so the size of the windows in which their two future events are predicted
reflects this.
Predictor 2
Predicted Interval: i2=2i,
trialstarter
Predictor 1
Predicted Interval: i,
trialStarter
perceived event
predicted event 1 predicted event 2
TimeLine tA-= 1  V1=02 V 1
Figure 17: The timing of a Predictor's window.
Figure 17 also illustrates the mathematics of how the decision thresholds, Pi somewhat less than 1 and P2
somewhat greater than 1, are used for the "when decision" to decide when the subject should result.
When the ratio (te/ipredictor) between the subjective duration of the currently elapsing interval (te, which
has its zero at the time when the Trial begins) and the interval encoded in the Predictor (ipredictor) exceeds
the decision threshold (Pi), the creature begins to expect the appearance of the predicted stimulus.
When the ratio exceeds another decision threshold (p2), the Predictor ceases to predict the event, and
generates an expectation violation response. Thus the Predictor effectively generates a "window" in
which it predicts an event will occur. The window's size is
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1 ipredictor t, 2 predictor (1)
where
ipredictor is the Predictor Interval in the Predictor that began this Trial
Pi is a creature-global constant slightly less than 1
P2 is a creature-global constant slightly greater than 1
te is the elapsed time since the Trial began (when the Predictor Context was met)
Some subtlety exists in the moment at which we start a Trial. If the stimuli in the Predictor Context
denote an external context - for example, hearing a bell ring - we begin a Trial when those external
conditions are perceived. If they instead denote self-action - for example, the act of pulling a lever - we
begin a Trial when the creature's motor system begins to perform that action. (Intent to perform the
action is insufficient, as the creature may be interrupted before its motor system is able to carry out the
request.) The Predictor Context can include a combination of external and internal conditions - for
example, it may require that the creature pulls a lever when a bell rings in order to start a Trial.
An ongoing Trial can expire in one of three ways. If the predicted event does occur during the time
window as expected, the Trial is declared successful. If, without explanation, the predicted event fails to
occur within the time window, the Trial can be declared a failure. If the predicted event fails to occur,
but an external mechanism can provide an explanation for why the Trial failed, the Trial is declared
explained. An example of an explained Trial is one in which the event fails to occur during the predicted
time window, but instead appears shortly before or after that window. Instead of calling that Trial a
failure, we declare it explained.
The Predictor keeps track of its short- and long-term reliability by recording the number of successful,
explained and failed Trials it has generated. We'll now see how this allows Predictors, through a
process of reinforcement, to learn about causality on the job.
3.3.3 How to Learn Causality on the Job
Although some Predictors might be built offline, thus representing apparent temporal causality
relationships the creature knows a priori, much of this knowledge must be learned during the
creature's lifetime. We now describe how a creature comes to generate and refine a new Predictor.
3.3.3.1 Concern yourself with interesting things
The first thing we need to do in order to learn about apparent temporal causality is to concern the
learning mechanism with only the most interesting things.
An immediate challenge for anything but the most trivial of systems is the tremendous size of the
perceptual state-space. Each stimulus might be considered another dimension of a massively
multidimensional space that is probably only sparsely populated with areas of perceptual interest. We
thus need a filter that separates the interesting from the uninteresting stimuli.
We use two heuristics for determining whether or not a stimulus is interesting. A stimulus can be
interesting on the basis of its novelty (how often it has been perceived) and its inherent salience (as
reported by its signal provider). Or, the action selection mechanism can report that it finds a stimulus
interesting for other reasons. For example, a stimulus that can be temporally correlated with important
consequences may be of interest, even though its inherent salience is low.
Adding a salience filter between perception and action selection provides an important barrier that lets
the creature focus on the important things - the things it might find useful to learn about.
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3.3.3.2 Generate Predictors to explain unexpected Stimuli
The creature would like to be able to predict changes to the stimuli it considers interesting. In fact, it is
the inability to explain changes to an interesting stimulus that prompts a creature to learn. In terms of
the action selection mechanism described in Section 3.2, if the react operation is unable to find a
Predictor that explains a salient stimulus onset, it is provided with an opportunity to consider
generating a new explanation.
Explanation generation is guided by salient events that are temporally proximate to the unexpected
stimulus. Recent Perception events on the TimeLine provide a convenient collection of all such
candidates. To generate the appropriate Predictor, we need simply identify the stimulus (or group of
stimuli) that seems the most likely explanation for the appearance of the unexplained stimulus. That
stimulus may represent some component of self-action, or some perception that has its origins in the
external world.
event, salience 0.2 TimeLine
event, salience 0.6 event, salience 0.4 unexplained event
thepa j I I
1.0
Temporal Proximity Discount
0.0
0.001 0.08 0.10
Likely candidates for Predictor Context
Figure 18: One possibility for selecting a likely context during Predictor generation. We model the choice of a
likely explanation with the tail of a Gaussian stretching from the present into the past. We assign each
of the recently-perceived stimuli a value produced by multiplying the appropriate value from the
Gaussian tail with the inherent salience of the stimulus. We add these values to a probability
distribution from which we select a reasonable explanation.
As illustrated in Figure 18, the explanation generator chooses a likely explanation that is both salient
and temporally proximate to the unexplained stimulus. It then builds a Predictor of the unexplained
stimulus with this explanation as its context. Although the particulars of function used to select an
explanation are unimportant, the probabilistic nature of its operation is crucial. It is impossible in most
complex systems to determine with absolute certainty which of the potential formal causes produced
the perceived effect.
The length of the Predicted Interval recorded in a new Predictor is equal to the perceived length of the
time between the selected explanation and the unexplained event. Thus, when creating a Predictor, we
effectively initialize it with its first "Trial" - the Trial that caused its creation. It's very possible that this
recorded interval is not optimal, so we allow a recorded interval to drift toward the intervals perceived
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in future every time there is a successful Trial; in other words, every time it gets a new data point. The
interval update equation that updates the recorded interval in a Predictor upon a successful Trial is
in n-( kRpredictor) + t * (1 - kRpredictor (2)
where
in is the new interval length
in is the previous interval length
t* is the perceived interval of this Trial (see Section 2.4.1)
Rpredictor is the Reliability of this predictor (to be discussed; see equation (3) ahead)
k is a constant slightly less than 1.
3.3.3.3 Refine Predictors by tracking their reliability
After we generate Predictors, we need to track their reliability. If we find that a Predictor is reliable, our
confidence in its predictive power will increase. On the other hand, if the Predictor is unreliable, we
may either declare it invalid, or choose to refine it in an attempt to improve its effectiveness. In order
for a Predictor to be able to detect a change in a non-stationary predictive relationship, it will require at
the very least an encoding of both its recent and long term reliability, so that it can detect when those
reliabilities differ.
The ability to distinguish between periodicity and probability is also important. A Predictor able to
ideally predict a periodic reliability schedule (for example, predicting that the event will appear on
every third trial) also requires a periodic function detector (like the one described in [Aittokallio,
Gyllenberg et al. 2000]). Note that a Predictor that expects an event to occur once every four times its
context is observed causes quite different expectations than does a Predictor believed to be valid
twenty-five percent of the time on a fixed ratio schedule. The former will generate a high-confidence
expectation every fourth time the Predictor Context is observed; the latter will generate a low-confidence
expectation every time the Predictor Context is observed.
A very simple metric for the long-term reliability of a Predictor is
Rpredictor - T e (3)
T +eT +bT
where
gr is the number of successful Trials
er is the number of explained Trials
bT is the number offailed Trials
The Short-term reliability can be computed similarly by taking into account only several of the most
recent Trials.
A discrepancy between the recent and long-term reliability of the Predictor might alert us to one of
several possible circumstances. It is possible - perhaps because of a change in the outside world - that
the Predictor has become erroneous. (This may happen frequently when dealing with a non-stationary
predictive relationship.) We may conclude that this spurious Predictor should be culled. Or, we may
wish to refine its Predictor Context, perhaps by a conjunction, generalization, or discrimination, in
order to improve its accuracy.
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We guide the refining of a Predictor by determining the reliability and frequency of salient stimuli that
are observed at the onset of the Predictor's Trials. If a particular stimulus (or the onset of a particular
stimulus) is both frequently present at the onset of successful Trials (those trials where the stimulus
appears as predicted), and frequently not present at the onset of Trials that fail, then that stimulus could
potentially be added to the Predictor Context.
At the completion of a Trial, the Predictor looks back along the creature's TimeLine at a window
around the Trial's start, and records all the events that occurred around that time. At the same time, the
Predictor also records salient stimuli that were present in the creature's target object. All of these stimuli
are potentially reliable indicators of the Predictor's validity: those found in the external world, in self-
action, and in properties of the target of that action.
From these recorded stimuli, we need to select the ones that could be most useful if added to the
Predictor Context. Candidates should be salient and reliable, meaning frequently present during
successful trials and frequently not present during unsuccessful trials. We offer two metrics that satisfy
those conditions.
Let g-r denote the count of successful trials, and bT denote the count of failed trials. If ga denotes the
number of times a stimulus a was present during a successful trial, and ba denotes the number of times
a was present during a failure, then the equation
ga (br ~ba.)
Rai = 9b 1 (4)(gKrbr +1)
where
gr is the number of successful Trials
bT is the number of failed Trials
ga is the number of times stimulus a was present during a successful Trial
ba is the number of times stimulus a was present during a failed Trial
satisfies these features. The first factor (ga/gr) provides the ratio of successful trials in which the
stimulus was present; the second factor (bT-ba/bT) provides the ratio of unsuccessful trials in which the
stimulus was not present. The additive term in the denominator prevents division by zero before we
have at least one good trial and one bad trial. Thus the reliability increases as the stimulus is present in
successful trials, and decreases as the stimulus is present in unsuccessful trials.
Another formulation, which treats a rare stimulus more favorably, is as follows:
Ra2 = (TI b [2g. + 1[g, + br -(&a + ba )] +0(ba)] (5)
In this formulation, the stimulus is effectively rewarded two points for every time it appears in a good
Trial (the first term), one point every time it does not appear concurrent with a Trial (the second term),
and no points when it appears concurrent with a Trial that fails (the third term). The multiplying factor
scales the results to the range 0 to 1. The intuition works as follows: each stimulus gets a default of 1
point for every Trial, so every stimulus will receive the same score by default. But, if the stimulus
appears concurrent with the Trial and the Trial is successful (ga), the stimulus scores 2 points instead of
1. And if the stimulus appears concurrent with an unsuccessful Trial (ba), it scores 0 points for that
Trial. So again, the metric looks favorably on stimuli that are present during successful trials, and
unfavorably on stimuli present during unsuccessful trials.
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3.3.4 The representation of action reflect ideas about causality
We now have a representation for Prediction, but it will only be useful to the creature if the action
selection mechanism can take advantage of apparent temporal causality knowledge.
Until now, our discussion of action selection has been rather general. At this point, we introduce a
more concrete example of an action selection representation, so that we can show how it accommodates
a dynamic representation of causality.
We present the ActionTuple, the fundamental representation of action originally proposed by Blumberg
(see [Burke, Isla et al. 2001]), that we have augmented to include the previously-discussed Predictor
representation.
when to do it?
what to do?
TriggerContext Action ObjectContext doUntilContext
what to do it to?
how long to do it?
why do it: what will be the future results?
intrinsic
value
Results
and how will this particular action affect me?
Figure 19: Anatomy of an ActionTuple. In English, from left to right by slot: "In a certain context," "if I perform
an action," "on something," "for a certain amount of time," "how will it change the world," "and how
will it affect my drives?"
As seen in the Figure 19, the ActionTuple encapsulates the concepts of trigger, object, action, doUntil, and
in this new formulation, results.
The TriggerContext indicates external conditions that must
be met in order for the ActionTuple to be activated.
The Action represents what the creature should do if the
ActionTuple is active.
The ObjectContext describes necessary conditions on the
things to which that Action can be applied.
The doUntilContext describes the conditions that cause the
ActionTuple to deactivate.
The Results. slot contains Predictors, as described in the
previous Section, each of which predicts that when the
ActionTuple is activated, an event will occur after an
interval with a certain probability.
The Intrinsic Value is a multidimensional value (with the
same dimensions as the DriveVector - see Section 3.1) that
"When should I do it?"
"What should I do?"
"What should I do it to?"
"How long should I do it for?"
"What will be the results?"
"How will this affect me?"
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describes the ActionTuple's perceived effect on the
creature's Drives.
In Section 3.3, we indicated that each Predictor has a corresponding Predictor Context that determines
when it generates expectations. We now see that the Predictors found in an ActionTuple's Results slot
inherit their Predictor Context from the ActionTuple in which they are found. The TriggerContext,
Action and ObjectContext slots conveniently denote external context, self-action, and the target of that
action. All three of these context-denoting slots are represented by lists of stimuli. If the
TriggerContext is the only one of these three slots that contains stimuli, it represents an external
context, and the Predictors begin a Trial when that external context is perceived. On the other hand, if
the ActionTuple contains an Action, its Predictors only begin a Trial when the creature performs that
action. This prevents the creature from generating unfounded expectations if it is interrupted before its
motor system has a chance to perform the requested action.
Intrinsic value is provided as a fixed value for some ActionTuples, which we refer to as consummatory
ActionTuples. (This is a bit of a misnomer, because although high-magnitude, negative intrinsic values
suggest the satisfying of drives, other ActionTuples have large, positive intrinsic values, suggesting that
they will cause an increase in the creature's drives, thus serving as punishment rather than a reinforcer.)
Consummatory ActionTuples therefore represent particular states (either action states or states defined
by the context of the world) that the creature considers inherently "good" and "bad."
Although performing a particular action may not have an effect on the creature's drives, an
ActionTuple's predicted Results may change the world in a way that would facilitate satisfying drives
in the future. Thus the utility of an ActionTuple is defined by more than just its intrinsic value. We
combine an ActionTuple's intrinsic value with the Predictors contained in its Results slot to compute its
perceived value. The perceived value factors in the probability that the ActionTuple's activation will
facilitate the future activation of consummatory ActionTuples. Importantly, a predicted Result is
valuable if and only if it will help satisfy a currently unsatisfied prerequisite of a consummatory ActionTuple.
Thus the perceived value of an ActionTuple changes as our needs change, and as the perceived external
conditions in the world change.
The perceived value of an ActionTuple is calculated as
predictors facilitatedTuples
pvi(t)=vi(t)+k R, pv(t (6)
m n
where
where
vi(t) is the intrinsic value of ActionTuple i
Rm is the reliability of each associated Predictor
pvn(t) is the perceived value of each facilitated ActionTuple
k is a discount factor
In this implementation, this perceived value equation uses a maximum recursive depth of 4. In the next
subsection, we provide a concrete example of how perceived value is calculated.
3.3.5 Changing ideas about causality
We've seen how the ActionTuple combines representations of action and apparent temporal causality.
We next examine how this representation can accommodate changing ideas about causality. We'll use
an example to show how ActionTuples can be used to represent and learn an apparent temporal
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causality relationship. Consider an experiment wherein a dog is conditioned to salivate upon hearing a
bell ring, because the bell provides a reliable predictor of the appearance of steak.
We begin with the assumption that the dog has the inherent idea that consuming steak will reduce his
hunger drive. We construct the consummatory ActionTuple that represents this relationship (assuming
the animal has only two drives, hunger and sex).
in English: ------------------ eating ----------- some food ------------- until it's gone-------------------------satisfies hunger drive
[-10,01
eatAction foodShape foodShapeU PerceptActivationL PerceptDeactivation
TriggerContext Action ObjectContext doUntilContext Results
Figure 20: Consummatory ActionTuple representing eating food.
The consummatory act of eating the food is represented by the ActionTuple depicted in Figure 20: with
a null TriggerContext (meaning no external conditions need to be met), the eat Action in the Action slot,
the foodShape stimulus as an ObjectContext (meaning the action must be performed on food, and thus
can't be performed unless food is present), and the notion "until consumed" in the doUntilContext.
The intrinsic value indicates that the creature's hunger drive will be mitigated if this ActionTuple is
activated. If the creature has a sufficiently high hunger drive, any sensible action selection mechanism
(like the one described in Section 3.2) would be inclined to activate this ActionTuple when the creature
perceives food, on the basis of its ability to reduce the hunger drive.
During this experimental procedure, the dog will be presented with two salient stimuli: the sound of
the bell, and the appearance of a steak. In her attempts to explain these unexplained stimuli, the dog
will, after a time, come to the idea that the sound of the bell is reliably followed by the appearance of
food.
in English: --hearing a bell ---------------------------------------------------------- predicts food in 5s---- which itself isn't consummatory
null
bellSound 0 foodShape
PerceptActivation Percept in 5s (33%
TriggerContext Action ObjectContext doUntilContext Results
Figure 21: The ActionTuple representing the prediction that the bell sound predicts the future appearance of
food.
This bell-predicts-steak notion is represented by an ActionTuple, shown in Figure 21, which produces
the conditioned anticipation response when the creature hears the bell. (It turns out it that is not
whimsical to speak about a real dog's "expectation of food," as evidence from Rescorla's lab,
Dickinson's lab and Colwill's lab suggests that in classical conditioning protocols, subjects do learn to
expect the reinforcer, using what is called a stimulus-outcome association (Gallistel, pers. comm.).) The
TriggerContext for this ActionTuple is the bellSound, the ObjectContext null, the Action null, and the
doUntilContext null. The Results slot contains the Predictor indicating that something with the
foodShape property will appear in a few seconds, at this point with 33% reliability.
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in English:--hearing a bell - predicts food in 5s-----which itself isn't consummatory
null
bellSound foodShape
PerceptActivation Percept in 5s (33%
TriggerContext Action ObjectContext doUntilContext Results
but it would facilitate
eating-------------some food ----------- until it's gone----------------------- which satisfies hunger drive
1-10, 01
eatAction U fofdShape UT7 toodShapeSPerceptActivation PerceptDeactivation
TriggerContext Action ObjectContext doUntilContext Results
t context that needs to be satisfied
thus the perceived value of hearing a bell is [-10, 01 *0.33 =[-3.3, 01
Figure 22: How the concept of perceived value makes hearing the bell a good thing.
Although the intrinsic value of the "hearing a bell" ActionTuple (depicted again at the top of Figure 22)
is null (zero), the concept of perceived value makes its activation seem like a good thing to the dog. It
indicates that the activation of this ActionTuple can reliably lead in future to the activation of another
ActionTuple that will satisfy the hunger drive.
The perceived value of the "hearing the bell" ActionTuple is calculated by the sum of its intrinsic value,
and the intrinsic values of the ActionTuples it facilitates multiplied by a discount factor. The discount
factor for each term is a function of the probability that the required stimulus will appear. In this
example, the dog is conditioned that food will appear on average every one in three trials. Thus the
discount factor is 1/3, and since the perceived effect on the hunger drive of eating the predicted food is
negative 10, the perceived value of the "hearing the bell" ActionTuple is -10/3.
in English -------------------- sitting --------------------- for an appropriate interval -- predicts food in 5s-- which itself isn't consummatory...
null
sitActio duration of foodShapeIit It1 9UsitAction Percept in 5s (33%I II| ||II
TriggerContext Action ObjectContext doUntilContext Results
Figure 23: Self-action variation of the experiment, part 1.
A variation of this experiment might involve only providing the dog with a food reinforcer when it sits
down after the bell rings. In this case, the dog may begin with the hypothesis (suggested by the
ActionTuple in Figure 23) that simply sitting down predicts the treat. Because some of the Predictor's
trials will be reinforced and others will not, the Predictor will eventually realize that whether or not the
bell sounds around the start of a trial reliably predicts the trial's success.
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Thus, the new ActionTuple in Figure 24 will be created. The Action is still the sitAction, but now the
bell sound has been added to the TriggerContext. The Results slot, as in the above example, contains a
Predictor predicting the foodShape's onset in a few seconds. Thus, predictions can, but do not have to,
involve self-action.
hearing the bell ring---------and sitting ------------------------------- for an appropriate interval-----predicts food in 5s-- which itself isn't consummatory
null
bellSound 9sitAction duration of 0 foodShape
PerceptActivation sitAction Percept in 5s (33%I | | | | | | |
TriggerContext Action ObjectContext doUntilContext Results
Figure 24: Self-action variation of the experiment, part 2.
3.3.6 Forgetting must accompany learning
We have discussed how the various learning mechanisms generate Predictors and ActionTuples. But as
Minsky notes in Society of Mind [Minsky 1985], we have good reasons to occasionally forget things. A
culling mechanism is needed to remove information that is no longer useful to the creature. In this
architecture, this means removing ActionTuples and Predictors that aren't useful for predictive
purposes, or have been inactive for an extremely long time.
We can think of ourselves as managing a cognitive economy. For every source (for example, of
Predictors and ActionTuples) there must also be a sink, or the creature will be overwhelmed by growth.
Matching each source with a sink allows a creature to adapt to changes in the world without leaving
vestigial knowledge lying around.
It is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between negative and unimportant knowledge. Arguably, the
most pressing avenue for future work (discussed below) is an improvement to the culling sentinel that
would allow it to handle negative knowledge. Perhaps a list of "inactive" ActionTuples that were once
useful would allow the creature to exhibit spontaneous recovery. The "inactive" list could continue to
guide innovation without overloading the action selection mechanism.
3.4 Apparent Temporal Causality lets us model the Effects on Affect
Apparent temporal causality does more than just help us select actions. It also provides feedback from
the action selection process that informs the creature's motivational and affective state. Not only can
affective state help the creature to exhibit intentionality and convey its motivational and affective states
to a viewer, but it also can inform the creature's action selection decisions.
Recall that a creature's DriveVector can be used to determine the scalar utility of something in the
world. This utility can also be interpreted as a creature's affective stance towards something. The
creature can use its affective stance toward a stimulus to generate appropriate reactions to its onset and
predictions of its impending onset. A creature can also use the affective stance to determine whether or
not it wishes to encourage the onset or offset of a stimulus. Thus an interesting effect of the
DriveVector approach is that a creature's emotional memories of some context (an object, action, or
whatever else) are affected by its current needs.
We have already discussed how the creature's motivational state (summarized in the DriveVector) has
an effect on the action selection mechanism. Its affective state also has an influence on action selection,
although not as pronounced. Affect doesn't have a direct influence on the generation, testing or
refinement of Predictors. However, feedback from the Affective Variables does impact the creature's
special curiosity drive. The curiosity drive, as noted in Section 3.2.1, influences the creature's decision
of whether to explore or exploit, and also has an influence on the inner working of the explore
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operation (Section 3.2.3). Thus, by altering the creature's propensity to explore rather than exploit, its
affective state has an indirect but important effect on learning by altering the rate at which the action
selection mechanism generates and refines Predictors in the explore operation.
There are four events related to apparent temporal causality that may lead to a change in affect: the
perception of a salient stimulus that triggers a prediction, an expectation violation, an explanation of an
expectation violation, and expectation fulfillment. Concurrent with each of these events is an
appropriate change in the creature's level of arousal, as well as a change in stance proportional to the
affective weight of the event.
It is obvious how the creature's level of arousal should change at each of these events. Appropriate
changes to the creature's stance can be summarized as follows:
* Upon perceiving a salient stimulus, calculate the change in affective stance, w, based on the
ability of that stimulus to predict intrinsically valuable states in the future. This generates
either eager anticipation or trepidation, depending on the sign of w.
* On expectation violations, lose (1+k)w, where k is some number between 0 and 1. This generates
disappointment or relief, depending on the sign of w.
* On explanations of expectation violations, gain kw back, counteracting the disappointment or
relief factor.
* On expectation fulfillment, gain w2-wi, where w2 is the affective weight of the new ActionTuple,
and wi if the affective weight of any ActionTuple that predicted w2. This generates satisfaction
when the expectation comes true. (Satisfaction in the sense that the expectation was satisfied,
but not in the sense that it satisfies the creature's drives. It is important to distinguish between
effects on a creature's motivational state and its affective state - a challenge exacerbated by the
fact that the vocabularies used for the two discussions often overlap!)
perceived perceived perceived intrinsic
affective value 72 -- ,. 240 300 . 1000
30% 80%' ,30%
prediction reliability A I BC D
typical chaining A I B 1 C 1 D
72 + (240-72) + (300-240) + (1000-300) = 1000
(surprise) (expected) (expected) (expected)
- B arrives later than expected- -C arrives later than expected-
timing errors A -* No B - B Do No C -- C -- D
72 + -72(1+k) + [ 240+72(k)] + -240(1+k) + [300+240(k)] + (1000-300) = 1000
(surprise) (exp'n vio'n) (explanation for vio'n) (exp'n vio'n) (explanation for vio'n) (expected)
anticipation disappointment relief & anticipation disappointment relief & anticipation satisfaction
Figure 25: An example of conservation of affect during predictions, perceptions, and expectation violations.
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Figure 25 provides an example of how various events cause changes to affective stance. Here we have
four stimuli, A through D. A predicts B with 30% reliability, B predicts C with 80% reliability, and C
predicts D with 30% reliability. D has a utility of 1000. The "typical chaining" example shows the
affective changes that occur when all four stimuli appear in sequence, the former three each predicting
the appearance of the next. The "timing errors" example shows what happens when the intervals the
creature uses to predict B and C are too short. When each stimulus fails to appear in the predicted
window, this generates an expectation violation and the creature's affect drops below the original level,
thus representing disappointment. Then, the stimulus appears late, generating an explanation and thus
renewed anticipation.
3.4.1 Generating New Reward Markers
Our ability to compute the affective value of a stimulus offers us flexibility in the way we produce
reward markers for machine learning algorithms elsewhere in the system. Many machine learning
algorithms, such as the one that drives acoustic category formation in the acoustic pattern matcher,
employ a reward marker (and sometimes a punishment marker) to inform the classifier of the results of
a recent classification. (See Appendix A and [Ivanov, Blumberg et al. 2000] for further discussion.)
The fundamental question is: which stimuli constitute reward markers? An obvious answer is a
stimulus that indicates the appearance of a reinforcer like food. However, there may be times when we
can predict the impending onset of a reinforcer with sufficiently high confidence that we can proceed to
post the reward marker before the reinforcer actually appears. We do this at the moment when we can
first predict, with confidence above a threshold, the future appearance of all the stimuli necessary to
activate a consummatory ActionTuple. In the "ringing bell reliably predicts steak example" depicted in
Figure 22, the sound of the bell ringing may become a new reward marker.
3.5 Summary
We began this section with the notion that creatures have internal needs that they seek to satisfy. These
are represented by Autonomic Variables that we combine together into a multidimensional DriveVector
(Section 3.1). We then discussed the fundamental choice the action selection mechanism needs to make
- whether to explore, exploit or react (Section 3.2). To help the action selection mechanism make this
choice, we integrated an understanding of apparent temporal causality into the action selection
mechanism. Because Predictors allow a creature to reason about apparent temporal relationships
between stimuli, they allow an understanding of cause and effect that can accommodate changing ideas
in a dynamic world (Section 3.3). Finally, we showed how this understanding allows us to model the
effects on a creature's emotional state, and even generate new reward and punishment markers that can
facilitate perceptual learning (Section 3.4).
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Results for Synthetic Characters
As members of the Synthetic Characters group, we are interested in what happens when the
architecture described in Section 3 is integrated into a complete system. Does it allow us to create more
compelling and clever interactive creatures?
The results in this Section seem to suggest so. We describe here the results we have achieved
implementing the architecture and its representations, and using them to build two very distinct
autonomous virtual characters. Both characters are able to learn about apparent temporal causality in
their respective worlds. Building them has provided insight into the strengths and weaknesses of our
approach.
Describing these characters in more detail will provide us with an opportunity to discuss the learning
process in more depth, using output obtained from visualizers that allow observers to witness the
learning process occurring within a creature's brain.
All of the results in Section 4 were obtained from a working implementation. In contrast, we have yet
to carry out the hypothetical experiments described in Section 5 that describe how this system should
be able to reproduce psychological phenomena.
4.1 Integration into a complete Architecture
The action selection mechanism and the representations of apparent temporal causality discussed in the
previous Section have been integrated into the Synthetic Characters System Architecture that we
discussed in Section 2.3. (For the curious, the description in [Burke, Isla et al. 2001] is anything but
brief.) In Figure 26, we show the structure of the new architecture, highlighting the important changes.
Represent the world
IF
Study interesting things
Decide what to do
Informed by past, present and predicted future
Figure out how to do it
external
Sensory System
Perception System
Working Memory
internal
Autonomic Variables
Figure 26: Integration of concepts described in Section 3 into the complete system architecture shown in Figure 2.
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4.0
Stimuli
Salience filter
Maintain Statistics
Salient Stimuli
Action and Attention Selection
Integration of causality representation
High-level action requests
Navigation and Motor Control
We discuss three aspects of the integration here that may have more general application: how the
Stimulus abstraction is integrated, where we maintain statistics, and how we implement the salience
filter.
4.1.1 Finding Stimuli in existing Perceptual Representations
We've already seen how the Sensory System filters the creature's sensory input, and the Perception
System uses Percepts to classify and organize perceived features into an object representation in
Working Memory. But how do Stimuli fit into all of this?
At first glance, it may appear that a Percept and a Stimulus are equivalent. Both have an activation
threshold, and both represent an atomic component of the creature's perceptions. Suppose we wanted
the creature to learn that "when the tone sounds, food will appear in five seconds." Representing this
relationship involves two Percepts: the toneSound Percept, and the foodShape Percept. However,
consider the relationship "when the object to my left makes a tone, food will appear." Here, the "object
on my left making a tone" is represented in Working Memory as the toneSound Percept history of the
"object to my left" Belief. Perhaps more importantly, the reader can no doubt come up with arbitrarily
complex causal relationships that would require representations not found within this architecture.
With that in mind, we propose that the Stimulus provides a useful abstraction distinct from the Percept.
We have integrated three sources of stimuli in the current system.
The first source, not surprisingly, is the Perception System's Percept Tree. Each Percept is potentially a
signal provider for a Stimulus that indicates whether or not some sensory nugget has raised the
Percept's evaluation above its activation threshold. Each Percept can also provide a second signal that
causes a stimulus onset to occur whenever the Percept's evaluation falls below the activation threshold.
The resulting stimulus can be used to represent relationships like "when the tone stops, food will
appear."
The second source of stimuli is Working Memory. A Belief is capable of producing stimuli based on
each of its Percept activation histories. The onset of a Stimulus based on the toneSound Percept history
of the "object to my left" Belief represents the event "the object to my left made a tone."
Finally, Autonomic Variables provide a source of stimuli. They can back stimuli that allow a creature to
represent apparent temporal proximity relationships involving changes to internal state.
4.1.2 A Separate Statistics and Filtering Agent
Separating the statistics from the perceptual representations proved very useful. A separate agent we
call the TimeRate System provides a centralized location for the statistics kept for all the different kinds
of stimuli, reducing to negligible the changes that need to be made to the other parts of the architecture
in order to provide this service.
The TimeRate System treats other parts of the creature's brain, such as the Percept Tree and Working
Memory, as stimulus providers. On each timestep, it asks stimulus providers if they have discovered any
new StimulusBackings - signal providers that the TimeRate System can turn into Stimuli.
The TimeRate System also implements the salience filter (described in Section 3.3.3) that exists between
the massively multidimensional sensory input space, and the action selection mechanism that follows it.
4.1.3 Roadmap for the rest of the Section
The best way to describe the implementation in more detail is to show a how creature implemented
with the system learns about apparent temporal causality in its world. With this in mind, we now
introduce the two rather dissimilar characters (at least in terms of morphology) that have been built to
date using the architecture. First, we describe how the timing mechanisms facilitate new, more flexible
learning in Duncan the Highland Terrier. Then, we introduce a new character, and demonstrate in
depth the learning process occurring in that character's domain.
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4.2 How Time Learning Affects Duncan
Duncan the Highland Terrier is one in a long line of canine creations to come from the Synthetic
Characters Group.
Figure 27: Duncan the intrepid terrier.
Duncan's previous learning mechanism used a variation on the ActionTuple representation described
in this paper to implement the "click and treat" training paradigm described by Wilkes in [Wilkes
1995]. With that mechanism, creatures had no sense of apparent temporal causality, but instead used
back-propagation of intrinsic value in order to attribute value to the context-action pairs described by
ActionTuples. Instead of having a concept of perceived value that was derived from a representation of
causality, the creature would back-propagate a part of the intrinsic value of each activated ActionTuple
to the previously activated ActionTuple. Certain consummatory ActionTuples were attributed fixed
intrinsic values. These would tend to propagate their value back into the action-states that reliably led
to the consummatory states. Duncan would learn by generating new ActionTuples, each time
discriminating an increasingly precise context for the new ActionTuple which reflected which stimuli
were perceived to be the most reliable indicators of whether or not the old ActionTuple's activation
would lead to a "good" consummatory state.
Thus the previous incarnation of Duncan began his life by randomly selecting between different
behaviors. The user, playing the role of Shep the shepherd, was able to reward Duncan's behavior and
encourage him to perform particular actions, which he could eventually learn to associate with acoustic
patterns by discriminating an increasingly precise context in which he should perform each action.
The representation for apparent temporal causality offers the new incarnation of Duncan many benefits,
all of which arise from his ability to make explicit how he expects the world will change as a result of
his actions.
Instead of back-propagating intrinsic value, an ActionTuple obtains a perceived value because of its
predictive power, which is represented by Predictors in its Results slot. The capacity for an
ActionTuple to predict the appearance of food increases its perceived value if the creature is hungry.
This allows the creature to integrate the current state of the world into its appraisal of the value of an
ActionTuple. An action is only useful if it will change the world in a way that moves the creature closer
to performing a consummatory action. Thus an action that facilitates the appearance of food is not
valuable if there is already a vast amount of food available.
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Another benefit gained from Scalar Expectancy Theory is increased flexibility in the timing of the
reinforcer. Because of the nature of back-propagation learning, in Duncan's previous incarnation the
reinforcer needed to immediately follow the action we wanted to reinforce. Now, if Duncan comes to
expect a reinforcer to appear a slightly longer time after performing an action, he can form an
expectation of future reinforcement after performing the action, and as long as the Predictor is
reinforced around the expected time in the future, the perceived value of its ActionTuple would rise,
and thus the correct behavior would be reinforced.
The use of a salience filter that limits the sensory input being processed by the action selection
mechanism, in concert with the statistics-gathering properties of the Predictors, makes it possible for the
creature to generalize as well as specify the contexts for ActionTuples. In the previous implementation,
Duncan would progress down the Percept Tree, selecting increasingly specific contexts in which to
perform an action, at each step taking the path that seemed the most reliable. In the current
implementation, Duncan may start this process with any stimulus (that may represent any point in the
Percept Tree, or perhaps some other perceptual signal), choosing a context for a Predictor that seems to
be a reliable indicator of whether or not an action will lead to a reward. He can then use the results of
that Predictor's Trials to generalize or specify the context from there, employing the principle of
parsimony to arrive at the simplest explanation for how the world works.
Finally, while the previous incarnation would perform an action because that action was perceived to
move the world into a "better state" (as represented by the intrinsic value of the active ActionTuple),
creatures in this architecture make explicit their expectations of how the world should change as a
result of their actions. For example, a trained Duncan will sit when the shepherd says "sit" because that
action in that context will cause the explicit expectation that a food treat is forthcoming. This has
ramifications on Duncan's affective model. As described in Section 3.4, expectation allows for eager
anticipation (or trepidation) followed by either satisfaction or disappointment (or relief).
Thus Duncan reaps several benefits from an understanding of apparent temporal causality, all of which
stem from his ability to make explicit expectations about how the world will change as a result of his
actions.
4.3 The Goatzilla Domain
Goatzilla is the grizzled 200-foot-tall beast who inhabits the Scottish Highlands. What little we know of
his origins is a tale passed down in the oral tradition (Eaton, Dowling, Isla, Ivanov, McDarby, McDarby,
McDonnell, Nolan et. al., pers. comm.). As Duncan's master Shep tells it, Goatzilla was spawned in a
freakish accident. From time to time he emerges to graze on Shep's sheep, and then stumbles off into
the mist from whence he came. Shep insists that neither he nor Duncan have ever been considered
targets for one of Goatzilla's feeding frenzies. Speculation abounds: one expert is adamant that
Goatzilla feels guilty after eating the sheep, but a mental representation for guilt has yet to be found.
Perhaps the simplest explanation is best: Goatzilla is largely misunderstood; just a creature trying to
satisfy his drives. What's clear is that he can represent apparent temporal causality, and it's giving him
the capacity to cause some serious damage.
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Figure 28: Goatzilla and Shep share a moment.
To restore our previous tone... Goatzilla's deepest secret, of course, is that he's just a big dog. Because
he provides a superset of Duncan's functionality, we use him as our primary example, and discuss his
various Systems here in more detail. He exists in a complex domain where the ways in which he can
satisfy his drives sometimes involve external context, sometimes involve his actions, and sometimes
involve properties of the targets of his actions.
4.3.1 Perception System
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Figure 29: Goatzilla begins his life with a Percept Tree containing over 50 percepts. Colors indicate whether or
not the Percept is above its activation threshold; numbers indicate inherent salience.
Highlights on the External side of his Percept tree (everything under "location" in the Figure) include
two Classifier Percepts: the UtteranceClassifier Percept and the GestureClassifier Percept (neither are
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visible in this Figure). Both of these are containers for classification mechanisms used to classify audio
and video input respectively.
The Proprioceptive side of the Percept Tree (everything under the Proprioception Percept) contains the
Percepts that activate when particular motor states are achieved. These Percepts are provided with
moderately high inherent salience, so that the creature is interested in self-action and is guided to the
idea that self-action is a likely candidate for apparent causality relationships.
4.3.2 Autonomic Variable System
4.3.2.1 Drives
Goatzilla has five autonomic variables that are integrated into his DriveVector. His drives provide an
example of the various levels of abstraction that Autonomic Variables can represent (see Section 3.1).
Hunger is self-explanatory. It drifts upwards at a relatively low rate, has a moderate drive multiplier,
and decreases when Goatzilla consumes food.
Pain avoidance has a downward drift (suggesting healing), a fairly high drive multiplier value, and
increases autonomically when he is attacked, shocked, or otherwise injured. Goatzilla tends to avoid
painful situations, especially if already in pain.
Dominance is a more abstract drive that provides Goatzilla's desire to dominate other creatures. The
magnitude of the dominance drift increases when he perceives other Goatzillae. The drive declines
when he performs various acts of dominance (posturing, kicking, goring, and so on).
Curiosity is used by the action selection mechanism to help mediate between explore and exploit
operations (as described in Section 3.2).
The most recent incarnation also uses a praise drive that represents the social concept of being pleased to
receive verbal praise from the Shepherd, which the user can provide through a special interface. Unlike
the rest of the drives described here, the desire for praise is insatiable. The motivation for this
functionality came from the need for the creature to receive praise during a sheep herding scenario,
where the Shepherd wouldn't provide food treats as rewards for extended periods of time. A creature
might learn a social drive like this by first identifying conspecifics during a critical period, and later
seeking to please conspecifics perceived to be superior in a social hierarchy.
4.3.2.2 Affective Response
Both Goatzilla and Duncan use the stance and arousal autonomic variables (shown in Figure 12, page 32)
to represent their current affective state.
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4.3.3 Action System
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perform beg
perform gore
perform pirouette
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perform eat at sheepShape
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Figure 30: Visualizer of Goatzilla's default ActionTuples (without Results slots). The Reflex group is not shown.
Goatzilla begins with the simple Action System shown in Figure 30 that contains almost no a priori
knowledge. Most of his knowledge is learned through experience with the world. Each of his default
actions (sit, kick, pirouette, etc.) is represented by a very simple ActionTuple: a null TriggerContext, a
null ObjectContext, the corresponding Action, and a doUntilContext appropriate to the Action (either
one that expires at a particular interval after the motor action's activation, or one that waits for the
motor action's completion).
The Approach, Observe and Avoid ActionTuples are also initialized in the Action System. The
Approach ActionTuple causes Goatzilla to approach until near the target stimulus. The Observe
ActionTuple only causes Goatzilla to approach the target stimulus if he is particularly far away. The
Avoid ActionTuple causes Goatzilla to send a "flee" command to his Navigation System until he is far
away from the target Belief.
Two examples of consummatory ActionTuples are the "eat food" and "be shocked" ActionTuples.
The "eat fbod" ActionTuple is provided with a DriveVector with a negative hunger value, suggesting
that the creature has an innate sense that eating food will reduce hunger. In other words, the creature
considers the activation of this ActionTuple to be the "goal state," or something that is inherently
satisfying (see [Lorenz, Leyhausen 1973]).
The "be shocked" ActionTuple is an example of an action state that is added to the creature's group of
Reflex (or "Startle") ActionTuples. Unlike the other ActionTuples that are arbitrated between using the
explore, exploit and react mechanisms, when the TriggerContext of an ActionTuple in the Reflex group
is active, that ActionTuple is immediately activated, and remains active until its doUntilContext is no
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longer active. The ActionTuple's DriveVector contains a high, positive pain value, suggesting the
creature's innate knowledge that being shocked will cause pain.
4.3.4 Navigation and Motor Control
Goatzilla's Navigation System provides the ability to override incoming "approach" and "avoid"
commands with the appropriate locomotive action. His Motor System uses a verb graph representation
of different animations and transitions between those animations.
4.4 Experiments: How This Works in Practice
4.4.1 Learning about the World, and Recovering from Mistakes
The first test, which demonstrates the action selection mechanism and apparent causality
representations at work, involves unleashing a fresh Goatzilla into a world with the Shepherd and his
Sheep. Situated beside the Shepherd are several boulders, and a shed which serves as a "feeder": when
kicked by Goatzilla, it emits sheep. As the behemoth's hunger increases, he seeks and consumes any
sheep he can find.
Left to his own devices in this world, Goatzilla eventually realizes that kicking the feeder reliably leads
to the appearance of sheep. This is a nontrivial discovery. There are many objects in the world - sheep,
the feeder, boulders, a human, a boat, and so on, each of which has the potential to generate a variety of
different salient perceptual inputs. Added to which, the creature has in practice about a dozen different
actions he can perform at any moment. From this considerable space of both external and internal
context, the creature must arrive at the conclusion that apparently, an action (kicking) performed on a
particular type of object (the feeder) is followed about a second later by the appearance of food.
We now examine in more depth how this process occurs.
When all the sheep are consumed, Goatzilla's exploration operation causes him to explore by
generating new ActionTuples that perform actions on objects in the world. Those ActionTuples are
generated by replicating an existing ActionTuple containing the Action of interest, and adding to the
new ActionTuple an ObjectContext containing a salient stimulus from an interesting object in the world
(see Section 3.2.3 on exploration). When exploring the feeder, the mechanism at some point chooses to
perform the kick action, using the feederShape Percept's stimulus as the ObjectContext. Shortly after
kicking the feeder, Goatzilla perceives the appearance of sheep.
The appearance of the sheep causes Percepts like the sheepShape Percept to be activated in the
creature's Perception System. In the TimeRate System, the onset of the stimulus corresponding to the
sheepShape Percept's activation occurred. For many reasons, this is a salient event: the sheepShape
Percept allows the creature to activate the consummatory ActionTuple eat food ("perform eat at
sheepshape"), an inherently good thing because of its ability to help satisfy the creature's hunger drive;
and, additionally, as if that weren't enough, the sheepShape Percept's activation is unusual. Thus, the
"sheepShape Percept onset" stimulus event is added to the list of salient events to be passed through
the salience filter.
The onset of this "appearance of food" stimulus is passed to the action selection mechanism, where the
react operation is called upon to process the stimulus onset event. The react operation polls the
TimeLine for any Predictors that predict the appearance of the sheepShape Percept. Finding none, and
noting that the sheepShape Percept seems highly salient, the react operation generates an explanation of
the perception in the form of a Predictor. This is done by looking back at recent events on the
TimeLine, and using a combination of the salience of these events and their temporal proximity to the
unexpected event to come up with a potential explanation (Section 3.3.3). The creature may have come
up with the right solution - that the unexplained event was a result of his previously kicking the shed,
causing the results are shown in Figure 31's Predictor Visualizer.
60 It's about Time: Temporal Representations for Synthetic Characters
perform stand (0.00)
perform defence (0.00)
avoid (0.00)
perform pirouette (0.00)
perform eat at sheepShape (-19 56)
perform gore (0.00)
perform beg (0.00)
observe (0.00)
approach (0.00)
perform sit (0 00)
avoid at feederShape (0.00)
perform kick (-6 52)
sheepShape in 1 82 33 33% (g&e 50.00%, g 2500%)
nOW
Figure 31: The Predictor visualizer. Predictors are arranged by ActionTuple, and a TimeLine for each Predictor's
timing mechanism is shown. Here, the "perform kick" ActionTuple causes the prediction of something
sheep shaped to appear after an interval of about 1.8 seconds with a long term reliability of 33%.
Recently, 50% of that Predictor's Trials have been either successful or explained, and 25% have been
successful.
We now examine how the creature can recover from any one of a number of possible mistakes.
perform stand (0 00)
erform beg (-3.33)
sheepShape in 1 20 16 67% (g&e 16.67%, g 16.67%)
now perform eat at sheepShape (-19.98)
perform pirouette (0.00)
perform defence (0.00)
approach (0.00)
perform stand at cubeShape (0 00)
perform gore (0.00)
Figure 32: A Predictor that will soon prove unreliable: that begging produces sheep. Grey vertical bars on the
TimeLine indicate the start of a Trial; the colored region that follows indicates the window in which the
onset of the stimulus is expected to occur. Color indicates the status of the trial: ongoing blue;
successful green; failed red; explained orange.
Let us assume for a moment that the creature formed an erroneous Predictor based on another self-action;
for example, the notion that begging in front of the shed results in the appearance of the sheep. The
creature would then proceed to test this Predictor, in the process producing superstitious behavior,
until the Predictor proved sufficiently unreliable. When the creature is next hungry and there are no
sheep present, the "perfonn beg" ActionTuple will have a high perceived value because of its perceived
ability to predict the appearance of sheep a few seconds after the creature performs the begging action.
The creature will activate this ActionTuple, sitting down and thus causing an expectation that sheep
will appear momentarily, complete with a corresponding change in affect (anticipation). When the
sheep do not appear, there will be an expectation violation and another corresponding change in affect
(disappointment). As repeated occurrences of this expectation violation occur, the reliability of the
Predictor will decline toward zero, until it is finally culled.
perform kick (-7.24)
eosheep hape in 1.68 27.27% (g&e 14.29%, g 14.29%)
now observe (0.00)
avoid at feederShape (0.00)
approach at humanoidShape (0.00)
Figure 33: A Predictor with the right Action (kick), but no ObjectContext (so he'll kick anything and expect food).
The creature may also form a hypothesis with the correct Action but incorrect ObjectContext; for example,
the hypothesis that kicking anything leads to the appearance of sheep (an ActionTuple with the kick
Action, no ObjectContext, and a corresponding Predictor in the results slot). In this case, assuming the
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creature occasionally kicks both the shed and other objects in its world, the reliability of the Predictor
will be reasonably high, but still result in expectation violations every time the creature kicks another
type of object. After enough such expectation violations, the Predictor will almost certainly be refined
by the inclusion of the feederShape Percept as an ObjectContext, creating a reliable predictor of
successful trials. (Ideally, the TriggerContext will also be modified to include the qualification that the
sheepShape Percept be inactive, so that the entire Predictor reads, "When no sheep are present, and I
kick a feeder-shaped object, I predict something sheep-shaped will appear in n seconds.")
Finally, the creature may form a correct Predictor with an incorrectly recorded interval length. To recover
from this mistake, instead of creating a new Predictor, we allow the peak of the interval recorded in the
existing Predictor to drift toward the interval perceived by the creature in subsequent trials. The time
scale invariance of Scalar Expectancy Theory is convenient here, as it will cause the size of the
prediction window to automatically increase as the estimated interval increases.
perform kick (-0 53)
7 sheepShape in 0.9738.89% (g&e 85.71%, g 42.86%)
observe (0.00)
avoid at feederShape (000)
approach at humanoidShape (0.00)
avoid (0.00)
perform defence at sheepShape (0.00)
perform defence at cubeShape (0.00)
perform defence (0.00)
observe at sheepShape (0.00)
perform gore at x-anoidShape (0.00)
perform kick at feederShape (.0.91)
sheepShape in 0.87 66.67% (g&e 100.00%, g 42.86%)
now perform stand at cubeShape (0.00)
Figure 34: Learning the right thing. The "perform kick produces sheepShape" Predictor at the top of the Figure
has a lower long term reliability than does the "perform kick atfeederShape produces sheepShape" at the
bottom of the Figure. After a few more Trials, the former Predictor will be culled. The active prediction
suggests the creature just kicked the feeder. A few moments ago, he kicked something other than the
feeder, activating the upper predictor and causing a failed trial.
To summarize, we have looked at how the creature can recover from several mistakes it might make
while trying to learn a nugget of apparent temporal causality - forming an erroneous Predictor based
on another self-action, forming a Predictor without a discriminating ObjectContext, or incorrectly
recording the interval between stimuli.
4.4.2 Learning Curves for "Kicking Produces Food" Predictor
We examine the learning curve for a Predictor by detailing the response of the "perform kick produces
sheepShape" Predictor described in Section 4.4.1 as it responds over the course of 20 Trials, each trial
representing the act of kicking an object. Eventually, the Predictor refines its context to generate the
more accurate and precise "perform kick at feederShape produces sheepShape" Predictor.
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1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
Sh ape of object kicked
Figure 35: The results of 20 trials. Trials without bars were not reinforced, and thus declared "failures."
In Figure 35 we see the creature's perceived results of the 20 trials. The Predictor was generated at the
end of the first trial, after the feeder was kicked the first time and food appeared unexpectedly. On
most of the trials where the creature kicked the feeder, food appeared in approximately three-quarters
of a second. On the fifth trial, the Predictor drew the erroneous conclusion that kicking a boulder
resulted in the appearance of sheep. Those events, while temporally proximate, were not causally
related.
Recorded Interval after each Trial
1.25
Interval (sec)
1.00
0.75 - -"
0.50
0.25
0.00
Trial 7 declared "explained"
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -"-RecordedInterval
Trial + Perceived Interval
Figure 36: Learning the predicted interval.
In Figure 36, we see how the Predictor's recorded interval adjusts toward the perceived interval of each
reinforced trial. The magnitude of the "drift" experienced by the recorded interval toward each
perceived interval is proportional to the long-term reliability of the Predictor, a metric we show below
in Figure 37.
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Figure 37: Long-term and Short-term reliabilities of the Predictor.
The Predictor's reliability, computed using the simple metric shown in the Figure, changes as trials
succeed or fail. For the short-term metric, only several (in this case seven) recent Trials are used to
calculate the reliability. At the seventeenth trial in this example, the difference between the short-term
and long-term reliabilities exceeded the refinement threshold, and the Predictor was prompted to refine
its context. It did so, using data like those shown in Figure 38 that indicate the reliability of stimuli that
are present around the start of trials.
Reliability of Candidates for Predictor Context Metric 1
Reliability Metric 1.00
R1
0.75 Selection Made Here
0.50 0
-*-Feederl
0.25 - -A- Rock1
-U- Human1
0.00 - -....... , -.-..-..- r-.-r-.-.-.-r-.-.-.-r- -r- -r- .-t- .-r- .-r- -r-. -,-. ,
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Figure 38: Reliability data for Predictor Context candidates, using reliability metric 1 (equation (4)).
For clarity, we show in this Figure only three of the salient stimuli that are potential candidates for the
Predictor Context. However, it is important to note that there are many other such candidates; in fact,
the Predictor is tracking the reliability of every salient stimulus. It is obvious from the data that the
feeder is the most reliable candidate, and, as mentioned above, it is selected at the seventeenth trial to
be added to the Predictor Context.
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Reliability of Candidates for Predictor Context, Metric 2
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Figure 39: For comparison to Figure 38, reliability data for Predictor Context candidates, using reliability metric
2 (equation (5)).
4.4.3 Clicker Training
The time and rate learning mechanisms also provide a robust implementation of a form of
reinforcement learning known as clicker training. Clicker training is form of applied operant
conditioning used to train live animals like dogs and dolphins, as described by Wilkes in [Wilkes 1995].
The trainer employs a hand-held "dicker" device that emits a short, sharp clicking noise. During the
first phase of training, the trainer associates the click with a food treat by clicking, and then
immediately giving the creature a treat.
When the animal has learned that click precedes treat, the second phase of training begins, in which the
trainer provides a click-and-treat only when the animal performs the desired behavior. The click acts as
a salient event marker, indicating to the animal the precise time at which it performed the desired
action. In accordance with Thorndike's Law of Effect, described in [Thorndike 1911], the frequency of
the behavior that leads to the reward will tend to increase. In practice, the desired behavior does not
simply appear, but rather is "shaped" by the rewarding of increasingly accurate versions of the
behavior.
If some other signal, such as an utterance, should trigger the appearance of the behavior, we enter a
third phase of training, in which the desired trigger signal is made to appear some of the time when the
animal performs the action, and the animal rewarded only when it performs the action with the signal
present. The signal then becomes a reliable indicator of the context in which the action should be
performed in order for the creature to receive a reward.
The architecture described in the previous section allows for a robust form of clicker training to take
place in synthetic characters. The creature is able to recover from any mistakes or incorrect guesses it
makes along the way without "bogging down" its mind with useless, superfluous, or out-of-date
information. We now describe how the architecture facilitates the three phases of clicker training.
4.4.3.1 First Phase: Associate Click with Treat
In the first phase of clicker training, the trainer clicks, and then follows that click with a treat. Because
the TimeRate System interprets the sound of the clicker as both an unusual and salient stimulus, the
clicker stimulus onset will be passed on to the action selection mechanism, causing a react operation to
be performed. The creature will not be able to explain the click, and, assuming that the trainer is
randomly clicking, any Predictors that are generated to explain what causes a click will eventually be
discarded as unreliable.
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perform sit (0.00)
avoid (0 00)
on clickSound (-16 39)
sheepShape in 1 57 83.33% (g&e 83.33%, g 83 33%)
now perform gore at clickSound (0.00)
avoid at feederShape (0.00)
Figure 40: Results of phase 1: A Predictor indicating that the click precedes treat.
Similarly, the appearance of food will be passed as a salient event to the action selection mechanism.
The creature will again attempt to explain this stimulus onset. There is a very high probability that it
will form a Predictor indicating that the click stimulus precedes the food stimulus, as the onset of the
click stimulus was not only highly salient, but also temporally proximate to the treat stimulus. When
the creature creates the appropriate "click precedes food" Predictor, it will encode the predicted
interval between the two stimuli as equal to its perception of the initial interval between those two
events. During subsequent trials, the prediction interval will drift toward the average dick-to-treat
interval used by the trainer.
Although when training live animals with the clicker-training procedure a click should always be
followed by a treat, the computational architecture will still work if this is not always the case. The
creature may instead grow accustomed to a long-term reliability for the dicker much less than 100%. In
fact, it is a change in the rate of reinforcement that motivates learning. When the creature detects a
difference between the short- and long-term reliability of a Predictor, an affective change is produced
that causes an increase in curiosity, and the Predictor is provided with an opportunity to refine itself.
4.4.3.2 Second Phase: Associate Action with Click
In the second phase of dicker training, the trainer clicks when the animal performs a certain action. At
this time, the creature still doesn't have a reliable Predictor for the appearance of the dick stimulus, but
the action selection mechanism's react operation is particularly prone to finding such a Predictor, as the
creature has a strong affective stance toward the dick stimulus (because of its ability to predict the
appearance of food).
perform beg (-11. 16)
cllckSound in 1.50 62.50% (g&e 71 43%, g 57 14%)
on clickSound (-21.87)
sheepShape in 1.60 91.67% (g&e 85.71%, g 85.71%)
now
Figure 41: Results of phase 2: A Predictor indicating that begging predicts a dick (top of Figure).
The creature will generate a Predictor suggesting that when it performs a particular action - for
example, sitting down - an onset of the dick stimulus will occur after an interval. When the creature
performs the action again, the Predictor places on the creature's TimeLine a Prediction Event indicating
that the click stimulus will appear momentarily. As Trials like this are successful and the Predictor is
reinforced, the creature will exhibit Thorndike's Law of Effect, increasing the percentage of the time it
sits down when it is hungry.
4.4.3.3 Third Phase: Associate Signal-plus-Action with Click
In the third phase of clicker training, the trainer will take advantage of the creature's propensity to
perform a particular action in order to associate a particular signal with that action. The trainer causes
the onset of the signal around the time that the creature performs the action, and only provides
reinforcement when the creature performs the action while the signal is present.
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on begSound, perform beg (- 4.83)
clickSound in 1.29 83.33% (g&e 85 71%, g 71.43%)
perform beg (-11. 16)
clickSound in 1.50 62 50% (g&e 71.43%, g 57.14%)
on clickSound (-21.87)
sheepShape in 1.60 91.67% (g&e 85.71%, g 85.71%)
now
Figure 42: Phase 3: the "begging when you hear the 'beg sound' results in a click" Predictor (top of Figure)
becomes more reliable than the simpler "begging results in a click" Predictor (middle of Figure).
The creature finds that the reliability of the Predictor it generated in the second phase of training
continues to decline until its recent reliability is substantially different from its long term reliability.
This will trigger the Predictor to refine its context in an attempt to become more reliable. It should note
that the presence of the trainer's signal at the onset of Trials is a particularly reliable indicator of the
success or failure of those Trials. Thus, the refined Predictor will include the trainer's signal in the
TriggerContext.
Over time, the simpler "beg produces click" Predictor formed during the second phase of training will
be culled, and the new "beg when I observe the signal produces click" Predictor will prove to be much
more reliable.
4.5 Summary
In discussing how we have integrated apparent temporal causality into the architecture, we have
introduced two characters - one in an applied operant conditioning domain, and the other in the more
whimsical Goatzilla domain - that demonstrate in more depth how the learning process occurs.
Duncan's example showed how an understanding of apparent temporal causality allows the system to
perform new and more robust forms of learning. Goatzilla showed how the action selection mechanism
and causality relationships allow a creature living in a complex domain to learn about its world. Both
examples illustrate how the system is able to create virtual creatures that operate in real-time in non-
trivial domains, solving problems, even capable of being trained like their real-world counterparts.
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5.0 Results for Cognitive Psychology
In the previous Section, we described results obtained by integrating the representations for apparent
temporal causality and action into an existing behavior system, and observing two characters built with
the augmented architecture. We now discuss this architecture's ability to reproduce a variety of
conditioning phenomena well-known to the cognitive psychology community.
We begin with a discussion of how useful and elegant Scalar Expectancy Theory's concept of time scale
invariance has been, and the challenges we have faced integrating Rate Estimation Theory into a
computational system. Inspired by Gallistel and Gibbon's contrast between the associative (Rescorla-
Wagner) framework and the timing framework, we then provide ActionTuple answers to some basic
questions from an introductory course on learning that demonstrate how our architecture differs from
the associative and timing models.
Finally, we discuss this architecture's theoretical capacity to recreate cue competition and background
conditioning phenomena. Although we have not yet had the opportunity to set up each of these
experiments and observe the resulting behavior, we offer here a theory of how the system should
perform in a variety of experimental setups.
5.1 The Utility of Time Scale Invariance
The time scale invariance suggested by Scalar Expectancy Theory provides an elegant representation of
internal timing in the Predictor representation. Because Predictors record the perceived interval
between two stimuli and use P-thresholds to generate windows in which stimuli are predicted, the
creature is able to predict short intervals with high precision, and exhibit a plausible amount of
uncertainty for longer intervals.
Consider the alternatives. We could have used an associative framework that did not include a temporal
window. We have already discussed (as do Gallistel and Gibbon) how this prevents us from explaining
many observable conditioning phenomena. We could have used a default interval length, assuming that
any predicted events would occur "very shortly" in the future. This technique, used with some success
in the previous architecture, prevents the creature from reacting appropriately when the interval
between events is more than a few seconds in length. If a shock is predicted to arrive in roughly twenty
seconds, the creature should probably wait nearly that long before taking action to avoid the shock. We
could have used a variable interval length and a fixed window size. The window size then becomes a free
parameter that would have to be arbitrarily set.
A final alternative would be to derive an algorithm for simultaneously learning both the interval length
and window size. This would allow us to express some temporal intervals that might be useful, say, for
having a creature learn a piece of classical music in the western tradition, for which it would need to
represent intervals of varying length with high prevision. To do this would require maintaining
additional statistics every time a stimulus is perceived. Without constraints, this would produce the
biologically-implausible result that creatures could learn to predict high-resolution events in the distant
future. There may yet be some heuristic that would allow us to learn interval length and window size
in a reasonable, biologically-plausible way. But for now, time scale invariance has helped us create an
intuitive and elegant representation for the causality relationships the system has needed to represent.
5.2 The Rate Estimation Challenge
As a computational model, Rate Estimation Theory is capable of explaining a wide variety of
observable conditioning phenomena in a particularly elegant way. Its underlying principles - the
principle of parsimony and the principle of rate additivity - have provided the foundation of this
architecture's design.
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Implementing a pure form of RET's computational process (described in Section 2.4.1.3) into the
computational architecture has posed two significant difficulties.
The first is one of scale: RET requires that we maintain a temporal coefficient matrix that contains
stimulus concurrence information for all perceived stimuli. For a system that must contend with
hundreds or possibly thousands of stimuli, the n2 scaling factor is a challenge. There are two beacons of
hope. First, this matrix is undoubtedly sparse, and it contains large regions that could possibly be
approximated. Second, the salience filter's ability to reduce the size of the input space offers us an
opportunity to reduce the magnitude of n.
The second challenge is one of computational complexity. Arriving at the corrected rates of
reinforcement for the stimuli involves at least one matrix inversion and a matrix multiply, plus a
recursion on this process for each redundant stimulus that needs to be removed. To add to this
complexity, in this architecture the values of stimuli are computed relative to their perceived effect on
the creature's current drive state, thus rendering it very difficult to cache the corrected rates of
reinforcement for various stimuli, or compute those rates of reinforcement "offline" with a process
happening in the background.
We have not been able to address these challenges, but our implementation provides an approximate to
RET that incorporates both of its fundamental principles in the way a creature attempts to explain its
world by building reliable Predictors. When trying to explain a surprising stimulus (during the react
operation), and when new stimuli are being chosen (while refining a Predictor), rate additivity is used
to assess the perceived value of a stimulus. The principle of parsimony is also fundamental in that the
creature is only motivated to learn the simplest explanation for how its world works. The stimuli
chosen to be added to the context of a Predictor during innovation are those that most simply and
reliably allow the creature to predict the future onset of a stimulus.
One thing worth noting here is that this architecture's Predictor implementation makes it very difficult
for the creature to represent random rate processes, something we discuss in more detail under "Future
Work" in Section 7.3.1.
The best way to illustrate how the approximation heuristics work is to take a cue from Gallistel and
Gibbon, and compare and contrast this architecture with the associative and timing models.
5.3 Different Answers to Basic Questions Redux
Inspired by Gallistel and Gibbon's contrast between the associative (Rescorla-Wagner) framework and
the timing framework, we provide ActionTuple answers to some basic questions from an introductory
course on learning. The standard and timing answers are reproduced from [Gallistel, Gibbon 20001.
1. Why does the conditioned response appear during conditioning?
Associative answer: Because the associative connection gets stronger.
Timing answer: Because the decision ratio for the whether-to-respond decision grows until it exceeds a
decision threshold.
ActionTuple answer: Because the confidence in a Predictor is sufficiently high to trigger a response
during a react operation.
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2. Why does the CR disappear during extinction?
Associative answer: Because there is a loss of net excitatory associative strength. This loss occurs either
because the excitatory association itself has been weakened or because a countervailing inhibitory
association has been strengthened.
Timing answer: Because the decision ratio for the whether-to-stop decision grows until it exceeds the
decision threshold.
ActionTuple answer: Because the confidence in a Predictor declines until it is below the culling
threshold.
(The extinction protocol is one wherein the CS is presented without the US until the CR disappears.)
3. What is the effect of reinforcement?
Associative answer: It strengthens excitatory associations.
Timing answer: It marks the beginning and/or termination of one or more intervals: an inter-
reinforcement interval, a CS-US interval, or both.
ActionTuple answer: It marks the beginning and/or the termination of one or more intervals: an inter-
reinforcement interval, a CS-US interval, or both.
4. What is the effect of delay of reinforcement?
Associative answer: It reduces the increment in associative strength produced by a reinforcement.
Timing answer: It lengthens the remembered inter-reinforcement interval, the remembered CS-US
interval, or both.
ActionTuple answer: It lengthens the remembered inter-reinforcement interval, the remembered CS-US
interval, or both.
5. What is the effect of non-reinforcement?
Associative answer: The non-reinforcement (the No-US) weakens the excitatory association; or, it
strengthens an inhibitory association.
Timing answer: The timer for the most recent inter-reinforcement interval continues to accumulate.
ActionTuple answer: The timer for the most recent inter-reinforcement interval, and the timers for any
Predictions on the TimeLine predicting the appearance of reinforcement (each corresponding to a
Predictor Trial), continue to accumulate. When significantly past the predicted time of a reinforcement,
the Trial associated with a Prediction will be flagged as a failure, reducing the corresponding
Predictor's predictive confidence.
6. What happens when nothing happens (during the inter-trial interval)?
Associative answer: Nothing.
Timing answer: The timer for the background continues to accumulate.
ActionTuple answer: Any timers from any TimeLine Predictions continue to accumulate, as do the
creature's background timer (its internal clock).
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7. What is the effect of CS onset?
Associative answer: It opens the associative window in the mechanism that responds to the temporal
pairing of two signals. That is, it begins a trial during which the updating of associative strengths will
occur.
Timing answer: It starts a timer (to time the duration of this presentation) and it causes the cumulative
exposure timers to resume cumulating.
ActionTuple answer: Each Predictor with the CS as its Predictor Context starts a Trial, causing a
Prediction Event to be placed on the TimeLine and its timer started. The cumulative exposure timers
for each Stimulus (and any concurrence duration exposure timers) resume cumulating, although the
cumulative exposure times are not used in this architecture.
8. What is the effect of varying the magnitude of reinforcement?
Associative answer: It varies the size of the increment in the excitatory association.
Timing answer: It varies the remembered magnitude of reinforcement.
ActionTuple answer: Predictors predicting various magnitudes of reinforcement are generated. These
magnitudes are assumed to be discretized by the available Percepts in the creature's Percept Tree (big
reinforcement, small reinforcement, etc.) The expectation violation results in an increase in the curiosity
drive, encouraging exploration.
9. Why is the latency of the conditioned response proportional to the latency of reinforcement?
Associative answer: There is no widely accepted answer to this question in associative theory.
Timing answer: Because the animal remembers the reinforcement latency and compares a currently
elapsing interval to that remembered interval.
ActionTuple answer: Because the animal remembers the reinforcement latency and compares a
currently elapsing interval (that of the Prediction found on the TimeLine) to the remembered interval
(the interval encoded in the corresponding Predictor).
10. What happens when more than one CS is present during reinforcement?
Associative answer: The CSs compete for a share of a limited increment in associative strength; or,
selective attention to one CS denies other CSs access to the associative mechanism (CS processing
deficits); or, predicted USs lose the power to reinforce (US processing deficits).
Timing answer: The rate of reinforcement is partitioned among reinforced CSs in accord with the
additivity and predictor-minimization constraints.
ActionTuple answer: Each CS will have a Predictor that predicts the appearance of reinforcement; thus
the creature will be highly confident that reinforcement is forthcoming, and the confidence in both
Predictors will rise when reinforcement appears. Predictor minimization constraints are handled by the
culling sentinel, which may observe redundancy among the Predictors.
11. How does conditioned inhibition arise?
Associative answer: The omission of an otherwise expected US (the occurrence of a No-US) strengthens
inhibitory associations.
Timing answer: The additive solution to the rate-estimation problem yields a negative rate of
reinforcement.
ActionTuple answer: A Predictor that uses inverted Percept activations is formed. Its containing
ActionTuple obtains a perceived value that indicates a negative rate of reinforcement.
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12. What happens when a CS follows a reinforcer rather than preceding it?
Associative answer: Nothing. Or, an inhibitory connection between CS and US is formed.
Timing answer: A negative CS-US interval is recorded, or, equivalently, a positive US-CS interval.
(More precisely: subjective intervals, like objective intervals, are signed.)
ActionTuple answer: An area for future investigation. The representations used - including signed,
subjective Predictor intervals - are sufficient for representing Backward Conditioning phenomena.
Either allowing the generation of negative CS-US intervals, or considering Predictors as bi-directional,
would allow Timing results to be reproduced.
13. How does a secondary CS acquire potency?
Associative answer: An association forms between the secondary CS and the primary CS, so that
activation may be conducted from the secondary CS to the primary CS and thence to the US via the
primary association.
Timing answer: The signed interval between the secondary and primary CS is summed with the signed
interval between the primary CS and the US to obtain the expected interval between the secondary CS
and the US.
ActionTuple answer: Two Predictors are generated: one representing the signed interval between the
secondary and primary CS, and the other representing the signed interval between the primary CS and
the US. These intervals are summed to obtain the expected interval between the secondary CS and the
US. The utility of the secondary CS is recursively computed using these two Predictors. (The concept
of perceived value makes this possible. The confidence of the two Predictors is multiplied to obtain the
expected confidence that the secondary CS will produce the US.)
14. How is CS-US contingency defined?
Associative answer: By differences in the conditional probability of reinforcement.
Timing answer: By the ratio of the rates of reinforcement.
ActionTuple answer: By ActionTuples representing the perceived confidence in a temporal relationship
between the CS and the US.
15. What is the fundamental experiential variable in operant conditioning?
Associative answer: Probability of reinforcement.
Timing answer: Rate of reinforcement.
ActionTuple answer: The reliability with which one event follows another after an interval.
5.4 Cue Competition
Conditioning to one conditioned stimulus does not occur independently of the conditioning that occurs
to other stimuli. Gallistel and Gibbon's model is particularly effective at explaining cue competition
phenomena, which describe the interplay of different stimuli during a conditioning procedure. It
would be constructive to consider how this architecture should reproduce or approximate these
phenomena, even though we have not yet had the opportunity to formally reproduce these
experiments.
In the following sections, we will adopt some terminology and abbreviations from the psychological
literature. The conditioned stimulus, or CS, is represented in this architecture by a stimulus found in the
TriggerContext or ObjectContext of an ActionTuple. The unconditioned stimulus, or US, is a stimulus
predicted by a Predictor. Each Predictor contains one and only one US, although an ActionTuple may
contain multiple Predictors and thus predict multiple unconditioned stimuli. In most experiments, the
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US is "unconditioned" because its appearance is considered to be inherently rewarding or punishing;
for example, the appearance of food, or a foot shock.
5.4.1 Blocking
------- A reinforced -- A, B reinforced together-- Result
Stimulus A y-Conditioned
Stimulus B Not Conditioned
Reinforcer Fj.....-j....
Figure 43: Blocking procedure.
Blocking describes the phenomenon that occurs when one CS is presented alone some of the time, and
together with a second CS some of the time. If the rate of reinforcement during presentations of the first
CS - Stimulus A in Figure 43 - is unaffected by the presence or absence of the second CS (Stimulus B),
then the second CS does not get conditioned no matter how often it is reinforced.
During a blocking procedure, this architecture would first cause the creature to form the Predictor that
the first CS (Stimulus A) predicts reinforcement. The creature's confidence in this Predictor would
increase as repeated appearances of Stimulus A are followed by reinforcement.
After this "A-predicts-US" Predictor has been generated, the creature will have no reason to generate
another Predictor the next time the US appears. It will have already been predicted by the first
Predictor. Thus, in accord with the principle of parsimony, the architecture finds no reason to learn
about a relationship between Stimulus B and the US, and blocking is correctly reproduced.
5.4.2 Overshadowing
When two CSs are always presented and reinforced together, a conditioned response generally
develops much more strongly to one than to the other. This phenomenon is known as overshadowing.
-------------------- A, B reinforced together-------------------------------------- Result
Stimulus A y Less Conditioned More Conditioned
n or
Stimulus B ------ j-----More Conditioned Less Conditioned
Reinforcer
Figure 44: Overshadowing procedure.
For any combination of CSs that have always occurred together, Rate Estimation Theory allows the
stimuli to register an infinite number of rate estimates that sum to the observed rate of reinforcement.
The principle of predictor minimization eliminates the redundant CSs, resulting in the selection of an
"overshadowing" stimulus that dominates the other stimuli and minimizes the number of stimuli
credited with predictive power. The stimulus that ends up overshadowing the others seems to be often
arbitrarily selected. Some work suggests that creatures may have innate biases toward selecting a
particular type of stimulus [Foree, LoLordo 1973].
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RET explains overshadowing and blocking without involving any free parameters for stimulus salience.
While those free parameters already exist in this architecture (and have already proven valuable during
action selection), our philosophy parallels RET in that the method we use for predictor minimization
does not depend on the salience of stimuli. Instead, it relies on the culling sentinel mechanism that
seeks to preserve only the simplest explanation for the appearance of a stimulus.
The culling sentinel, as described in Section 3.3.6, would not generate overshadowing phenomena, but
it could readily be augmented to do so. It currently eliminates the more complex of a pair of equally-
reliable Predictors that both predict the same outcome. The sentinel could similarly remove a Predictor
if another Predictor of the same outcome already exists, and the contexts for both Predictors consist of
stimuli with very high concurrence.
5.4.3 One-Trial Overshadowing
Overshadowing effects can become apparent after only one trial during which redundant CSs are
reinforced. This one-trial overshadowing effect should also be produced by this architecture as a result of
the react operation's attempt to isolate a single, simple explanation for the appearance of an unexpected
stimulus. It generates a single Predictor to explain an unexplained stimulus, immediately producing
overshadowing effects.
No attentional process is needed to exclude other CS candidates from "access to the associative
process," as Gallistel puts it. However, when the creature needs to randomly choose between two CSs
to select one explanation for use in a Predictor, it makes sense to take advantage of the creature's
attentional process by weighting the decision slightly in favor of a CS found in the creature's current
object of attention.
5.4.4 Relative Validity
The architecture should correctly model the relative validity effect, first demonstrated by Wagner and
discussed in [Wagner, Logan et al. 1968]. Consider three stimuli labeled A, B, and X which are used for
two types of trials: AX trials, in which A and X are presented; and BX trials, in which B and X are
presented. There are two protocols: P1, for which AX trials are reinforced and BX trials are not; and P2,
for which half the AX trials and half the BX trials are reinforced. Subjects that are exposed to the P1
protocol develop a conditioned response to stimulus A only, and subjects exposed to the P2 protocol
develop a conditioned response to stimulus X only. Hopefully Figure 45 will help make this
comprehensible.
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--------P1 protocol Only AX trials reinforced R-----
Stimulus A y Conditioned
Stimulus B Not Conditioned
Stimulus X Not Conditioned
Reinforcer
AX -- BX-- AX AX BX BX (order random)
Stimulus A yNot Conditioned
Stimulus B Not Conditioned
Stimulus X Conditioned
Reinforcer
----------- P2 protocol: Half of AX and half of BX trials reinforced --------------- Result
Figure 45: Relative validity procedure. In the P1 protocol, subjects have AX trials reinforced; in the P2 protocol,
subjects have half the AX and half the BX trials reinforced. P1 subjects develop a response to stimulus
A only; P2 subjects develop a response to stimulus X only.
The Predictor generation and culling mechanisms in this architecture should accurately arrive at the
result for the P1 protocol. A creature exposed to the P1 protocol will begin by generating a Predictor
with either X or A as the context. If A is chosen, no further surprises will occur. If X is chosen, the
creature will experience expectation violations during each BX trial, until the Predictor is no longer a
sufficiently reliable predictor to explain the reinforcer. Through Prediction refinement - or, if the first
Predictor is culled, another react operation - the expected Predictor involving A will be generated.
A creature exposed to the P2 protocol will begin with one of three hypotheses: that either A, B or X
results in a reward. If the creature chooses A or B, on a subsequent trial it will also hypothesize that one
of the remaining two stimuli also predicts a reward. The challenging case is the one wherein the
creature selects both A and B, and thus is on the road to developing a conditioned response to both A
and B. In this case, the formation of the prediction that X results in a reinforcer should come from the
partial reinforcement schedule, because neither A nor B will predict reinforcement with particularly
high reliability. The react operation, when performed on the appearance of the reinforcer, may
determine that the reinforcer was not sufficiently predicted by any existing Predictor, and generate a
new hypothesis that X predicts reward.
As is the case with Overshadowing, to perfectly reproduce this phenomenon, an augmentation to the
culling mechanism is needed that that would recognize A and B's concurrence relationship with X,
eventually causing the first two Predictors to be culled.
5.4.5 Inhibitory Conditioning
Inhibitory conditioning describes a procedure in which the presence of a stimulus predicts the omission
of reinforcement. Two features of the architecture make it possible for creatures to respond
appropriately to this procedure.
First, the SET/RET model records subjective rates of reinforcement. In this architecture, although we do
not incorporate rates of reinforcement, we record subjective DriveVectors which can be negative as well
76 It's about Time: Temporal Representations for Synthetic Characters
esult
as positive. Value is represented in terms of those DriveVectors, which contain a perceived effect on the
creature's drives relative to how they would change otherwise. Thus, if the creature predicts that in the
absence of action it will feel increasing amounts of pain, but in the presence of action A its level of pain
will remain constant, then the DriveVector that will come to be associated with action A is not zero but
rather very high. Similarly, if the creature predicts that a reinforcer is imminent except if a particular
stimulus is perceived, then that stimulus will have a high magnitude value, representing a relative
increase in drives.
The second feature of the architecture that makes this possible is that the creature is able to represent
the absence of a Percept as easily as it can represent its presence. It is a well-established fact that
animals do not represent the absence of a stimulus as readily as they represent its presence (Gallistel,
pers. comm.), an effect that we could model using different levels of inherent salience for each of the
stimuli. But regardless, both "absence" and "presence" Stimuli can potentially considered interesting
by the TimeRate System (see "Finding Stimuli in existing Perceptual Representations," Section 4.1.1).
We note that in this formulation, as in Gallistel's, the conditioned effects of an inhibitory stimulus have
nothing to do with inhibition in the neurophysiological sense.
5.5 Background Conditioning
Another class of conditioning experiments it would be useful to consider is the set of Background
Conditioning procedures. The truly random control protocol describes an experiment where the
background rate of reinforcement is the same as the rate of reinforcement when a transient CS is also
present. The important result here is that conditioning depends on the CS-US relationship, rather than
simply the pairing of the CS and US.
In this architecture, truly random pairing between the CS and the US will prevent the creature from
arriving at a reliable apparent temporal causality relationship. As the two stimuli continue to randomly
appear, assuming they are both salient, the creature will attempt to explain their appearance and
generate appropriate Predictors during the react operation. The Predictors formed will suggest that one
stimulus follows the other after a particular interval described by Scalar Estimation Theory. Any such
Predictor will inevitably be proven unreliable and discarded.
As a result, during the truly random control experiment, the creature will continuously be generating
low-confidence expectations as it perceives the CS and US. These expectations will not be met in a
sufficiently reliable way and the Predictors making those expectations will eventually be discarded.
Thus this architecture should perform like a real subject during a truly random control procedure:
Conditioning does depend on a CS-US relationship.
5.6 Backward Conditioning
Backward conditioning produces an association where the subject learns that the US precedes the CS.
From a prediction point of view this is problematic, as the CS does not enable the creature to anticipate
the US. But an elegant experiment by Cole et. al. demonstrates how backward conditioning can
sometimes provide a creature with a mechanism for predicting an eventforward in time [Cole, Barnet et
al. 1995].
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Delay Conditioning
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n
foot shock US
OR Trace Conditioning
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foot shock US
COMBINED WITH "Backward" Second-Order Conditioning
tone CS
clicking CS
Figure 46: The Cole experiment (after [Gallistel, Gibbon 20001, Figure 22A).
There are two versions of Cole's experiment. In the first, a delay protocol is used, whereby a tone CS is
followed after a delay by a foot shock US. In the second version, a trace protocol is used, in which the
tone is sounded, and then stopped, and then after an interval the foot shock US appears. (see the above
Figure). In both protocols, there is then a second stage of backward second-order conditioning, in
which the tone CS is followed by a clicking CS. This phase must be kept brief to prevent extinction of
the conditioning that occurred during the first stage.
Subjects who experience the trace conditioning protocol followed by the backward second-order
conditioning show signs of fear after perceiving the clicking CS. Explanations of this phenomenon from
associative and timing perspectives are found in Gallistel's paper [Gallistel, Gibbon 2000]. The
architecture described here should be capable of simulating this phenomenon by generating the
prediction of a tone CS backward in time, which in turn could generate a prediction of impending foot
shock US forward in time (past the present), thus triggering an avoidance response to the predicted
shock.
Subjects who experience the delay protocol instead show little or no fear. For those subjects, the
expected interval to shock at the onset of the secondary CS (the clicker) is 0. Thus, by the time they
perceive the onset of the CS, there is nothing to fear.
The TimeLine and Predictor mechanisms, as well as the implementation of the action selection
mechanism, are capable of representing the prediction of an event in the past. The intuition for why
this might happen is that the creature may believe it failed to perceive the event in the past. However,
Backward Conditioning will not emerge under the current Predictor generation procedure, as all
explanations it correctly created to account for the unexpected appearance of a stimulus look backward
in time for an appropriate explanation. We propose two ways that this problem could be addressed in
the Future Work section that follows.
5.7 Section summary
The cognitive architecture benefits from a tight integration of Scalar Expectancy Theory (Section 5.1).
We have developed heuristics that let us incorporate the principles behind Rate Estimation Theory, and
discussed challenges inherent in a direct implementation of its computational model (Section 5.2). We
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summarized the architecture's relationship to the existing associative and timing models of
conditioning (Section 5.3).
The architecture should, in theory, correctly reproduce several cue competition phenomena (blocking,
one-trial overshadowing, inhibitory), and would likely be able to reproduce others (relative validity,
overshadowing) with additional augmentation (Section 5.4). The system should correctly reproduce
background conditioning phenomena (Section 5.5), but a change to Predictor generation would be
required to perform backward conditioning (Section 5.6). Further discussion of avenues for future
work follows in Section 7.
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6.0 Related Work
This work borrows heavily from the impressive work that has come before. We summarize here some
of our inspirations from the fields of virtual ethology and conditioning.
6.1 Virtual Ethology
Using a simple perception-output mapping, Braitenberg ascribed to his vehicles affective qualities
ranging from love to fear, representing one of the original forays into the realm he called "synthetic
psychology" in [Braitenberg 1986]. Reynold's boids algorithm represented the first behavior-controlled
animation; see [Reynolds 1987]. Tu and Terzopolous's physically-based artificial fish model, described
in [Tu, Terzopoulos 1994], incorporated a perceptual model and a behavior system. Perlin's Improv
system is designed to create interactive actors. As opposed to beginning with intelligence, Perlin is
interested fundamentally in creating "actors" with powerfully scripted behaviors [Perlin, Goldberg
1996]. Damasio's somatic markers, described in [Damasio 1995], are a precursor to our drive-based
value attribution. A number of recent commercial software products have focused on interactive
characters, including PF-Magic's Dogz series [PF.Magic 1996], Cyberlife's Creatures series [Cyberlife
1998] and Evans' remarkable titans in Black and White, which he describes in [Evans 2001]. Our
Predictor innovation mechanism is functionally analogous to his entropy-based dynamic decision trees.
The Synthetic Characters Group's system architecture, known as c4, is described in [Isla, Burke et al.
2001], and in excruciating detail in [Burke, Isla et al. 2001].
The importance of considering perception and learning together was emphasized by Barlow in [Barlow
1990], in which he concludes that perception must play an important role in providing a representation
that promotes the efficient learning of predictive associations. Kline provides a discussion of prediction
for synthetic characters, and discusses the differences between surprise and expectation violation in
[Kline 1999]. Maes and Drescher also provide insight into working with reliability in [Maes 1989] and
[Drescher 1991]. Allen's work on temporal logic integrates temporal reasoning into a planning system
[Allen 1991].
deKleer provides a solid introduction to causal theories in [deKleer, Brown 1986]. Further discussion of
the application of causality is found in [Iwasaki, Simon 1986] and [deKleer 1986]. Pearl's discussion of
how we try to "explain away" why an event occurred in [Pearl 1988] influenced this architecture's
explain operation. Sheridan discusses the purpose of cognition and mental models in [Sheridan 1992],
and also describes behaviorist and hermeneutic challenges to mental models and rationality in
cognitive science. Also see Moray for more on the structure of mental models and the different types of
causality in [Moray 1990].
Finally, the structure of this thesis is largely inspired by Blumberg's Ph.D. work, [Blumberg 1996], in
which he describes how the architecture of the Alive project synthesized ethological principles and
classical animation. In this thesis, we similarly detail a model inspired by ethology, provide a robust
implementation in a creature, and discuss how that virtual creature is able to emulate many phenomena
observable in live subjects.
The shoulders of giants, indeed.
6.2 Models of Conditioning
As described in Section 5, Gallistel and Gibbon's timing model, detailed in [Gallistel, Gibbon 2000],
contrasts sharply with the standard model of conditioning mathematically formalized by Rescorla and
Wagner in [Rescorla, Wagner 1972] and [Wagner, Rescorla 1972], and described by Domjan in [Domjan
1998]. Using a nonstationary, multivariate time series analysis, Gallistel developed a spreadsheet
model of conditioning that incorporated SET and RET, available as [Gallistel 1992].
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7.0 Concluding Remarks
7.1 Important Ideas
7.1.1 Causality and Action Selection are integrated
While it may require a leap of faith for cognitive psychologists to assume that animals can implement a
subjective timing mechanism with neurons, computer scientists require no such leap, just a few lines of
code. Yet although it was easy code Scalar Expectancy Theory's timing mechanisms into Predictors, it
was much more difficult to figure out how the action selection mechanism could make use of the
expectations those mechanisms were generating.
The single most important realization that allowed us to take advantage of causality information was
that the contexts a creature uses to trigger actions can be equivalent to the contexts they use to trigger
predictions. If we use the same structure for both (in our case, the context of an ActionTuple), we reap
tremendous benefits, in that the creature can easily integrate knowledge of how the world works into
its action selection.
If a creature would like an event to occur in the future, it can perform an action that causes the
expectation that that event will occur after a given interval. Even if the appearance of some stimulus
should apparently cause a prediction of some useful future event, the creature can look for strategies
that result in the appearance of that stimulus. From an affective point of view, a creature can attribute a
value to each stimulus based on how its appearance can help move the world toward a more desirable
state.
7.1.2 Attention Selection and Action Selection are integrated
The previous Synthetic Characters architecture distinguished between an attention selection mechanism
and an action selection mechanism. We have found it useful to tightly integrate the two in the new
architecture.
The old attention selection mechanism employed a series of heuristics to set the object of attention. The
action selection mechanism could override that decision if it believed it had a better idea of what the
creature should attend to. The decisions made by the attention selection mechanism, however, did not
influence the action selection mechanism.
The heuristics used to guide the attention selection mechanism - the observation of things that are
large, moving fast, suddenly appear, and so on - are precisely the kind of events that the react
operation is called upon to process in the new architecture. Each of these events should have an effect
on the creature's object of attention, and in addition, each should also cause the creature to consider
interrupting its current behavior in order to provide a more involved response. A change in the
creature's focus of attention could be considered one part of such a response.
We also note that the target object chosen by the explore operation is influenced by the current object of
attention. Thus the action selection mechanism takes advantage of attention selection results.
7.1.3 A Desire to Understand the World Drives Learning
Our fundamental assumption is that learning is driven by a creature's desire to understand its world.
When an event occurs that the creature doesn't predict, the creature is surprised and invents an
explanation for why the surprising event occurred. When an explanation turns out to be erroneous, an
expectation violation occurs and the creature either refines the explanation or invents a new one. In the
absence of unusual stimuli, a creature's curiosity drive motivates it to explore the world. Thus, it bears
repeating that all three fundamental motivations for learning emerge from a desire to understand the
world.
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Certainly, the creatures described here are highly motivated to satisfy their drives by obtaining
reinforcement from the world. An attempt to maximize rate of reinforcement (or value) is fundamental
to many existing architectures and learning techniques. But in this case, instead of motivating a
creature's learning with a perpetual attempt to maximize rate of return, these creatures instead seek to
understand enough about the world to satisfy their drives effectively and predict the onset of salient
events. They are then motivated by curiosity to discover new things, some of which may lead to new
techniques for maximizing rate of return. One observer called this the "curious slacker" approach.
The results suggest it creates creatures that are better able to sustain the illusion of life. Perhaps we
ourselves are curious slackers. Or perhaps it's just me.
7.1.4 The Cognitive Economy
For every source there must be a sink. For every mechanism that deposits topology, there must be a
mechanism that performs withdrawals. The architect of a brain must consider these issues when
thinking about the performance of the system on various time scales - eight seconds, eight minutes,
eight hours, eight days - as well as in the theoretical limit. What will happen, for example, to
knowledge that is rendered useless by a change in the environment?
When virtual financial economies reach a critical mass, they predictably behave like their real-world
equivalents, and their management is wrought with similar challenges, such as those described by
Simpson in [Simpson 2000]. We have sought to address many of these challenges in the cognitive
economy already: over- and underproduction of commodities (like ActionTuples, Predictors, Beliefs,
and Percepts for classifiers) causing deflation and inflation accordingly (the value of learning an
important bit of knowledge relative to the computational cost of that knowledge); an unwillingness of
participants in the economy to use the available sinks (for example, ActionTuples refusing to be
removed by the culling sentinel); and above all, the tremendous challenge presented to an "economist"
who seeks to understand and predict the behavior of the system at macro- and micro-economic levels.
Animal brains are necessarily a sort of cognitive economy, as they are restricted by the finite number of
neurons that can fit into the brain skull cavity. An intriguing recent study suggests that licensed
London taxi drivers have significantly larger posterior hippocampi. Hippocampal volume was found
to correlate with the amount of time spent as a taxi driver. The researchers conclude there is a capacity
for local plastic change in the structure of the adult human brain in response to environmental
demands. [Maguire, Gadian et al. 2000] That the human brain can accommodate such change without
compromising the functionality of other systems is astonishing. Perhaps we need to develop an agent
or group of agents like the "B-Brain" watchdog proposed by Minsky (see [Minsky 1985]) that would
similarly accommodate changes to a virtual brain in response to environmental demands.
7.1.5 Nothing is Deterministic, and Many Distributions aren't Linear
An important part of designing a system that behaves reasonably like a real creature is coming up with
fitting (and hopefully intuitive) probability distributions for many of the operations that the system
needs to perform. Every Selection in Section 3.2.3 provides an example - Action Selection, Drive
Selection, Strategy Selection, and so on.
It is almost always the case that when a system in a virtual creature makes a deterministic decision
based on the "best option," the creature is afforded an opportunity to get stuck in a mindless loop. It
invariably will. Even during operations like exploit that are meant to produce the "best" option, each
decision should always employ some degree of randomness.
That being said, it's rare that a linear histogram probability distribution produces the desired results.
There is evidence to suggest that in some selection processes, animals behave like ideal detectors,
dividing their time between two or more behaviors in such a way as to maximize the reward provided
by the various options (see [Gallistel, Mark et al. 2001]). But in other kinds of selections, such as the one
performed by the DogEar Utterance Classifier when it classifies a new utterance, a linear probability
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distribution produces frustrating results (see Appendix A). If the match metric between an utterance
and the "sit" group is 0.4 out of 1.0, the match between the utterance and the "down" group is 0.5 of 1.0,
and the match for all other groups negligible, we should want to select "down" much more often than
5/9 ~ 56% of the time! On the other hand, under these conditions, we should want to select "down"
somewhat less than 100% of the time, or we may never explore the possibility that the utterance is being
misclassified.
Time spent choosing an optimal and intuitive distribution for a selection process is rarely wasted. After
all, the theory of probabilities, noted Laplace, "is nothing more than good sense confirmed by
calculation."
7.1.6 A Good Visualizer Is Worth Thousands of Lines of Debug Spew
The Percept Tree, Autonomic Variable, Action Selection, TimeLine and other visualizers proved
indispensable during the creation of this architecture. Many problems were diagnosed and solved as a
result of watching the creature in action and concurrently monitoring the state of its brain. For
example, the need for an affective model that responds appropriately to predictions, expectation
violations, and explanations (see Figure 25 and Section 3.4) became apparent while observing the
results of an earlier, more naive affective model.
The author marvels at Tufte's capacity to visualize information, although he can only aspire to his
elegance (both [Tufte 1990] and [Tufte 2001] are highly recommended). We have time for two
important lessons here. First, the visualization apparatus should be implemented as an entirely separate
entity from the rest of the architecture. Second, low-pass filters and other embellishments that alter the
information being presented are entirely unwelcome in the display. Such techniques reduce the
amount of information presented, and cause uncertainty about whether an effect comes from the
underlying process or the visualizer, whose function should be to effectively convey information.
7.1.7 The World Resists Oversimplification (Beyond Simple Credit Assignment)
Many credit assignment and machine learning algorithms make substantial assumptions about how the
world is represented (see [Kaebling, Littman et al. 19961 for a survey). Q-Learning, for example,
requires that the world is divided into discrete states, transitions between those states and is always
only in one state.
There is a large class of problems for which this technique is demonstrably useful. But even the
relatively simple virtual worlds described here resist reduction into simple states. The real world isn't
ever in a single simple state, nor does it conveniently transition from a single state to another single
state. If we are overzealous in our attempts to simplify our mental representations of the world, we risk
introducing what McCallum calls aliasing - the inability for learning representations in the system to
learn the right things, because the perceptual representations can't distinguish between the things they
need to learn about (see [McCallum 1995]).
Credit assignment in this architecture is guided by apparent temporal causality, but many of the
causality relationships doesn't fall nicely into the category "A obviously precedes B, thus A predicts B."
Some, but not all, are a result of self-action. Learning is guided by temporal proximity, but also
salience, existing knowledge, and common sense about how the world works. In summary: the world
is not a simple place, and our representations and learning algorithms must embrace this.
7.2 Summary of Contributions
We summarize here the key implementation and functionality details that distinguish this framework
from the previous Synthetic Characters architecture.
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7.2.1 Implementation
e All value in the system is subjective and drive-based. Subjective values are fundamental to the time
and rate representation found in [Gallistel, Gibbon 2000], and multidimensional drive-based
values have been re-incorporated from their use in the Alive project, described in [Blumberg
1996].
* The TimeLine provides a convenient collection of salient events both perceived and predicted in
the past, present and future.
e The Stimulus representation and TimeRate System provide useful abstractions for maintaining
statistics and filtering salient perceptual information that will be processed by the action
selection mechanism.
" Predictors provide a means for interacting with the TimeLine to represent knowledge of
apparent temporal causality.
e A Results augmentation to Blumberg's existing ActionTuple representation that integrates causality
into the action selection representation.
* A new attention- and action-selection mechanism with explore, exploit, react and startle as the
fundamental operations allows the creature to perform coherent, relevant actions and generate
appropriate affective responses to perceptions and predictions.
7.2.2 Functionality
e The ability to predict future events and react to those events, thus integrating elements of
reactive and planning systems.
e The ability to discover and refine knowledge of causality relationships in the world which may or
may not involve self-action by a process of hypothesize, test, refine.
e The reproduction of a variety of new conditioning phenomena, including blocking, overshadowing,
and other cue competition phenomena, as well as generalization and discrimination.
" An affective model that produces emotional memories about how things in the world - objects,
creatures, actions, and so on - affect the creature's drive state, facilitating a utility metric that is
a function of the creature's current drive state.
e The ability to perform reinforcement learning, even when a reinforcer does not immediately follow
the action being rewarded, by a process of learning new reward states and generating
perceived values.
7.3 Future Work
7.3.1 Further integration of rate information
A fundamental difference between this system and the representations suggested by Rate Estimation
Theory is that this architecture places much more weight on events such as the onset and offset of
stimuli. The creature does not make predictions based on the sustained presence of a stimulus. Thus,
the architecture is adept at modeling causality relationships between discrete "events." It is also
effective at modeling rates of reliability. But it is not yet capable of modeling rates of reinforcement in
the sense described by Rate Estimation Theory.
One problem with this architecture's emphasis on Predictors is that their assumption of "trials" is very
awkward for events that are generated by a random rate process, and thus do not regularly occur a
fixed interval after the onset of some context (the Predictor Context). When events are generated by a
random rate process, the creature ends up generating multiple, low-confidence Predictors that predict
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the appearance of the stimulus after varying interval lengths. It would be better if the representation
actually encoded in a single Predictor the concept "an event will occur with a given (low) probability at
some point in the next while, but I can't be much more precise about the interval." One way to "retro-
fit" this functionality into the existing architecture would be to have a sentinel detect the existence of
many similar Predictors with differing interval lengths, and amalgamate them into such a "random
rate" Predictor.
7.3.2 Integration of other Explanations
Concurrent work by Isla on spatial competence will provide the action selection mechanism with new
explanations for expectation violations that arise from spatial common sense (see [Isla 2001]). For
example, occlusion may explain the creature's inability to perceive a predicted stimulus. Integrating
Isla's work into the architecture would provide an intriguing testbed for merging knowledge of
temporal causality and common sense.
7.3.3 Grouping of ActionTuples
One way the system won't scale is that innovation eventually results in an unmanageable number of
ActionTuples that reside in one big list in the action selection mechanism. We need some way to
partition them so that they are perhaps task-oriented, or at least easier to manage and search through.
Minsky notes (in [Minsky 1985]) that the human mind's ability to recall useful information when it is
needed without being swamped with useless information requires an effective way to organize our
memories. Unfortunately for those of us trying to implement such a mechanism, the techniques our
own minds use to perform this task are inaccessible to consciousness.
7.3.4 Long-Term Memory
The creature's Working Memory currently contains Beliefs which represent caches of Percept activation
data for the various objects in the world. Each of the Percepts acts like a feature, and the Belief provides
the object representation. When the creature does not perceive or predict the presence of an object for
an amount of time, its corresponding Belief is eventually culled from Working Memory. But we would
like to learn about the predictive properties of these particular objects in the world!
At a more fundamental level, this architecture lacks a long-term semantic memory that would allow it
to store and recall objects the creature has perceived in the world. Such a system would allow it to
manage the Beliefs in Working Memory, possibly associating them with long-term concepts like "my
friend the shepherd" and "the shed beside the shepherd's dwelling" in a semantic memory. The
persistence of a concept about these objects beyond their stint in Working Memory could allow the
creature to learn about objects on a more permanent basis, perhaps by providing the TimeRate System
with Stimuli based on concepts on Long-Term Memory.
7.3.5 Learning Higher-Level Goals and Concepts
An exciting future direction would be to extend the learning mechanisms so that a creature can discover
- and then learn how to satisfy - higher-level goals. For example, in the Trial By Eire installation,
Duncan the terrier can learn that the shepherd wants him to circle the sheep clockwise, but he can't
understand that the shepherd's intention is to move the sheep south down the field. To understand an
intention like this, Duncan would need to represent more abstract, high-level changes to the world. In
the Goatzilla domain, it would be exciting for that creature to learn about and practice resource
management. In his current state, at the rate he's going through sheep, it's unlikely he'll survive the
harsh Highland winter. More abstract goals and concepts would facilitate many exciting new kinds of
behavior.
It's about Time: Temporal Representations for Synthetic Characters
7.3.6 Theory of Mind
The creatures in the current system have no theory of mind. Although many ethologists would argue
it's unlikely that dogs are capable of theory of mind (see [Shettleworth 1998] for discussion), integrating
theory of mind would be an exciting avenue for future research.
Goatzilla kicks the shed because he knows that action will eject the sheep, but he has no concept of the
fact that they're running because they're scared out of their wits. Without theory of mind, he can learn
that kicking the shed causes a loud noise and makes the shed rumble, and the sheep bolt as a result.
But what if he could learn that kicking the shed causes a loud noise and a rumble, and that terrifies the
sheep, who end up bolting out offear? Understanding even a little about the sentience of other creatures
would give the learning mechanisms new insights into which strategies and avenues for exploration
might prove effective in the future. For example, if a creature wants to make sheep bolt, and he knows
they bolt when they're afraid, that creature might ask himself: well, what would make me afraid?
Theory of mind would assist in understanding final causality as described by Moray in [Moray 1990],
and discussed previously in Section 3.3. The notion of integrating the other types of causality - material
causality, efficient causality and final causality - to this system's understanding of formal causality is
both exciting and daunting.
7.3.7 Augmented Predictor Generation: Playing with Cause and Effect
Backward Conditioning is not possible under the current scheme, as all explanations generated by the
explain function to explain the onset of a stimulus look backward in time for a cause (cause, it assumes,
precedes effect). We propose two untested techniques for augmenting Predictor generation that might
allow for effects like Backward Conditioning.
The first would be to consider every Predictor to be bi-directional; that is, we employ the knowledge
that the effects of a Predictor may have been caused by the earlier appearance of that Predictor's
context. Thus, when the react operation is called upon to explain the appearance of a stimulus, if it fails
to find a Predictor on the TimeLine that explains the event, it could look for Predictors that would have
reliably predicted the event had they been previously activated. It is possible that the creature simply
did not perceive the activation of a Predictor Context; and if it had, then it would have predicted the
appearance of this stimulus. A significant difficulty with this approach would be determining which, if
any, of the possible causes we should attribute to an effect.
The second way to perform Backwards Conditioning would be to generate Predictors that specifically
predict the prior appearance of a stimulus. (Since the interval encoded is already relative, we are able
to represent this as a "negative" interval.) It remains unclear why the creature would want to form
such a Predictor. Why generate the Predictor that A precedes B instead of the more useful one that says
B follows A? Perhaps because A predicts the reinforcer C.
7.3.8 Negative Knowledge and the Culling Sentinel
When is negative knowledge useful and when is it simply a waste of memory? The culling sentinel
could also be improved to implement some of the protocols discussed above if it employed knowledge
from the RET temporal correlation matrix that is now stored in the TimeRate System. The most obvious
implementation of the Overshadowing protocol, for example, requires the culling of ActionTuples that
are identified as redundant because their start contexts exhibit a high degree of temporal correlation.
Such a mechanism would also make the architecture's ability to model the P2 protocol of Relative
Validity much more reliably (see Section 5.4.4).
7.3.9 Spontaneous Recovery and the Culling Sentinel
Two major reasons why the culling sentinel exists to remove Predictors and ActionTuples are that they
take up space, and that a superfluity of ActionTuples slows down the action selection mechanism. We
have already described above (see Section 7.1.4) how Predictors that were once useful might be
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"retired" without being culled completely. Storing the maximum reliability ever achieved by a retired
Predictor might help us implement a spontaneous recovery mechanism if that Predictor was perceived
to become useful again in the future.
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Appendix A: Classification Techniques
Utterance Classification: DogEar
The DogEar system integrated into the UtteranceClassifier Percept mediates verbal communication
between a human participant and one of the virtual creatures. It converts a human participant's
utterance data into a Cepstral coefficient format that the creature processes. The integration of the
classifier into the Perception and Action Systems demonstrates one way in which the results of action
selection can influence perceptual categories.
Sound bites (recorded at 11025Hz) are obtained by using a thresholding algorithm that averages the
signal over windows of 512 samples. Recording starts when the signal is above the threshold, and ends
when it has been below the threshold for three successive windows. The sample is then trimmed at
each end to the nearest zero-crossing.
We have chosen to use a vector of Cepstral coefficients as a representation. Inspired by the way a dog
interprets the sound it hears, the creature does not comprehend language, nor does it have a concept of
language. What matters is the acoustic pattern of the speech signal; thus, a Cepstral coefficient
representation is sufficient to encode the necessary information. Cepstral analysis is a technique that
removes the pitch ripple from high-resolution speech spectra, as examined by Rabiner and Juang in
[Rabiner, Juang 1993]. The goal of Cepstral analysis is to obtain the vocal tract response after removing
the pitch ripple.
The DogEar system performs this task robustly, even in high-noise environments, by filtering the log-
magnitude of the signal with an inverse FFT. This is followed by truncation of the coefficients beyond
the pitch frequency, and then a forward FFT [Intel 1998]. In the Fourier domain, we use 10 filters
placed linearly on a scale from 100 Hz up to 2 kHz, followed by 10 additional filters laid out on a Mel
scale up to 6400 Hz. Analysis is performed using a window size of 512 samples and an overlap of 256
samples per window. Dynamic Time Warping, as described in [Rabiner, Juang 1993] and [Intel 1998], is
used to implement the distance metric between two utterances.
We have used two previous methods to group the utterances obtained in this way. In the incarnation
described in [Yoon, Burke et al. 2000], the system included a short-term memory module with a fixed
number of memory cells, each of which represented a group of classified utterances. When a new
utterance was heard, it was compared to the utterances in all the groups to see if the distance of the
newly arrived data in any of the groups is closer than a threshold. In the Clicker version described in
[Isla, Burke et al. 2001], the second incarnation of Duncan used the token associated with each action to
generate groups of classified utterances.
In the new architecture described by this thesis, instead of associating utterance groups with Actions,
we associate utterance groups with ActionTuples. The result is increased flexibility in the sort of token
a creature can learn. For example, the creature could learn to touch a blue object upon hearing the
word "blue," and touch a yellow object upon hearing the word "yellow," a representation that would
have been difficult to produce in the previous system without providing special-case ActionTuples.
Additionally, the new learning mechanism's ability to generate a new reward marker using reliable
predictions of a reinforcer's impending appearance allows the creature more flexibility for when it
sends a reward signal to the classifier.
Deciding to add a new group to the classifier is a decision of great consequence, as the performance of
the classifier degrades as the number of categories it must distinguish between increases. Thus a new
group is added only when the creature creates a new ActionTuple based on the UtteranceClassifier
Percept. When the action selection mechanism, through an act of innovation, creates an ActionTuple
that is associated with the UtteranceClassifier Percept, the UtteranceClassifier Percept spawns a new
child Percept that represents a new Utterance group. An ActionTuple can then be formed based on the
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new Utterance group. If all ActionTuples based on the SpecificUtterance Percept are removed from the
action selection mechanism, that utterance group is destroyed.
Gesture Classification
A similar ClassifierPercept scheme is used to implement gesture classification in the system. For the
details of the system, please see [Ivanov, Blumberg et al. 20001. The implementation similarly uses a
GestureClassifier Percept and its children, GestureModel Percepts, to allow the creature to interpret and
learn from the input coming from a video stream.
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Appendix B: Mathematics
We summarize here many mathematical details of the mechanisms described in Section 3.
Scalar Expectancy Theory
First, we restate Scalar Expectancy Theory's timing equation (see Section 2.4.1.2):
t*=k*tT (7)
where
t* is the recorded interval
k* is the timing error
tT is the cumulative subjective time recorded by the timing
mechanism
Drives and DriveVectors
Evaluation of a drive da (see Section 3.1.1):
dn(t) = evaln(t )-setpointn| (8)
where
dn(t) is the evaluation of drive n at time t
evaln(t) is the evaluation of Autonomic Variable n at time t
setpointn is the set point of Autonomic Variable n.
How Drives d1..dn are combined into DriveVector DV:
di (t)dmi (t)
DV(t) = d2(t)dM2(t))
Ldn (t)dmn (t)
where
dmn(t) is the drive multiplier for drive n at time t
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Utility and Affective Stance
The utility u of something with value v (Section 3.1.1):
u(t) = v(t) -DV(t) (10)
where
v(t) is the value of the thing at time t
DV(t) is the evaluation of Autonomic Variable n at time t
- is the dot product operator
Note that for ActionTuples, the perceived value pv(t) is substituted for v(t) in equation (10).
The affective stance a toward something with utility u (Section 3.4) is:
a(t) = k u(t) (11)
where
u(t) is the utility of the thing at time t
k is some constant
Predictors: Reliability
The Long-term Reliability of a Predictor, R, is computed (as in equation (3), Section 3.3.3.3) as
Rpredictor - T+e (12)
T T T
where
gT is the number of successful Trials
er is the number of explained Trials
br is the number of failed Trials
The Short-term reliability is computed similarly, but only takes into account the seven most recent
trials.
Predictor innovation occurs when the difference between the long-term and short-term reliability
metrics exceeds the innovation threshold, 0.25.
Within a Predictor, the reliability of a stimulus a, S., that may become part of the starting context
(reproduced from equation (5)) is computed as
1
Sa 1 [2g, +1[g 1  + bT (g, + b )]+0(b)] (13)2(gT+bT)
where
gr is the number of successful Trials
br is the number of failed Trials
ga is the number of times stimulus a was present during a successful Trial
ba is the number of times stimulus a was present during a failed Trial
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When selecting a new Predictor context, the predictors compete probabilistically on the basis of their
stimulus reliability values S (equation (13)). They are each processed by the following Boltzmann
distribution function before being added to a histogram for selection of a single new stimulus to be
added to the Predictor Context.
f(i) = eksi (14)
where
k is the Boltzmann constant
Si is the reliability metric value for stimulus i (equation (13)).
Predictors: Trials and Interval Learning
The interval update equation (Section 3.3.3.2, equation (2)) that updates the recorded interval in a
Predictor upon a successful Trial is
in = il(kRpredictor) + t * (1- kRpredictor (15)
where
in is the new interval length
in-i is the previous interval length
t* is the perceived interval of this Trial (as in equation (7))
Rpredictor is the Reliability of this predictor (as in equation (12))
k is a constant slightly less than 1.
A Trial (Section 3.3.2) predicts an event to occur between the times
1 ipredictor te 2 predictor (16)
where
ipredictor is the Predictor Interval in the Predictor that began this Trial
Pi is a creature-global constant slightly less than 1
P2 is a creature-global constant slightly greater than 1
te is the elapsed time since the Trial began (the Predictor Context was met)
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ActionTuples
The perceived value of an ActionTuple (reproduced from equation (6)) is calculated as
predictors facilitatedTuples
pvi (t) = vi (t)+k R, pv,(t)(17)
m n
where
vi(t) is the intrinsic value of ActionTuple i
Rm is the reliability of each associated Predictor
pvn(t) is the perceived value of each facilitated Action Tuple
k is a discount factor
In this implementation, the equation uses a maximum recursive depth of 4.
Action Selection
Exploit: The exploit operation selects a single ActionTuple to activate by taking the utility value of each
ActionTuple and selecting one option out of a normalized histogram probability distribution after they
are processed by the function
exploit(i, t) = e(k(t)dc"sty"(t)pv(t) (18)
where
dcuriosity(t) is the magnitude of the curiosity Drive (equation (8))
pvi(t) is the perceived value of ActionTuple i
for each ActionTuple i. The Boltzmann constant k(t) is arbitrarily set, although it provides a useful
degree of freedom for tweaking the histogram's propensity to select the "best" option. This winner-
take-all selection chooses one ActionTuple to become active.
Explore: The explore operation performs several selections, each using a similar distribution.
Attention Selection is performed by taking each of the Beliefs in Working Memory and selecting one
option out of a histogram probability distribution after they are processed by the function
attentionSelection(i, t) = ekB'(t) (19)
where
Bi(t) is the interest level in Belief i at time t.
for each Belief i.
Drive Selection is performed by taking each of the creature's Drives and selecting one option out of a
histogram probability distribution after they are processed by the function
driveSelection(i, t) = ekdj(') -1 (20)
for each Drive i. The subtracted term prevents the selection of a drive with a magnitude of exactly 0.
Action Selection is then performed using equation (18).
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React: The react operation must make a decision whether or not to respond to an unexpected stimulus.
When it observes an unexpected stimulus, it calculates the utility (equation (10)) of all new
ActionTuples representing actions and reactions (approach, avoid, observe) facilitated by the stimulus.
It selects one option out of all of these options, as well as the currently active ActionTuple (which has its
utility multiplied by a factor slightly greater than 1 to encourage persistence) using equation (18).
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